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INTRODUCTION
Over the last twenty years, American payments have
significantly evolved.1 In 1990, check payments made up the
single largest category of American payments by far-then, check
payments more than doubled either the total number of cash and
credit or debit card transactions, and exceeded both types of
transactions together.2 In that time, several different evolutions
in payments have occurred. The establishment of credit cards as
mainstream access to payments rather than access reserved for
those that had a special means of access-such as business
travelers, club members, or those with superior financial
means3 -and the innovative introduction of peer-to-peer payment
processing through third parties such as PayPal,4 are just a
1 Ron Borzekowski et al., Consumers' Use of Debit Cards: Patterns, Preferences,
and Price Response, 40 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 149, 149-50 (2008); Marc
Rysman, An Empirical Analysis of Payment Card Usage, 55 J. INDUS. ECON. 1, 30,
34 (2007); Kenneth J. White, Consumer Choice and Use of Bank Credit Cards: A
Model and Cross-Section Results, 2 J. CONSUMER RES. 10, 18 (1975).
2 See SUSAN HERBST-MURPHY, TRENDS AND PREFERENCES IN CONSUMER
PAYMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE VISA PAYMENT PANEL STUDY 1 (2010) (indicating
"increasing adoption over time of plastic and other electronic payment forms, while
usage of cash and checks has declined"); see also THE NILSON REPORT, Issue 761,
Apr. 2002; THE NILSON REPORT, Issue 823; Dec. 2004; THE NILSON REPORT, Issue
869, Dec. 2006.
3 See Matthew J. Bernthal et al., Credit Cards as Lifestyle Facilitators, 32 J.
CONSUMER RES. 130, 138 (2005); HERBST-MURPHY, supra note 2, at 9-12 (analyzing
the modern trends in payment methods, and noting that the preferences vary with
such factors as age, gender, life stage, and income); Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics
of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 88 (2000).
4 Some technologies in that time have been tried and failed. See, e.g.,
Christopher R. Plouffe et al., Why Smart Cards Have Failed: Looking to Consumer
[Vol. 88:39
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couple of innovations that have shaped consumer expectations for
engaging in the marketplace over time. Americans in that time
have become far more comfortable with non-traditional
intermediaries-that is, non-banks-being involved with their
financial transactions and have embraced payment mechanisms
that, unlike their banking or credit-based counterparts, offer
fewer protections against loss of value or the risk of company
failure.5
In the last fifteen years, the emergence of stored money
systems-also known as stored value products-by merchants for
the purpose of deferred sales to consumers has both innovated
and challenged the framework of American payments.6 The first
stored money system in the United States was the Neiman
Marcus Card, which allowed consumers to preload money on a
plastic card to give away as a gift or use themselves in the future.
Since the pre-paid card's emergence in the market in 1994, the
basic transaction has remained unchanged. Consumers pay cash
or use credit or debit cards to obtain credits with merchants who
honor those credits for merchandise at a later date.7 Credits are
maintained using an electronic recording inventory, maintained
either by the merchant-a closed-loop system-or by a third
party-an open-loop system.8 Now, stored value systems are far
and Merchant Reactions to a New Payment Technology, 18 INT'L J. BANK
MARKETING 112, 112-13 (2000).
, Daniel Hough et al., World of Choice: Consumer Payment Preferences, BAI
BANKING STRATEGIES, Jan-Feb. 2009, at 15 ("It's not surprising that electronic
payment... has outpaced paper. What is surprising is how quickly and aggressively
consumers have embraced these forms of payment and how pervasive they have
become.").
6 Building a Better Bank Card: Reaching the Unbanked with Stored Value
Cards, RFSI STRATEGY GUIDE 4.1, available at http://www.cfsinnovation.com/
systemlfiles/imported/managed-documents/bankcard.pdf (last visited Sept. 16,
2014).
7 Neiman Marcus was the first major retailer to introduce the marketplace to
"stored value cards" in 1994 when it replaced paper gift certificates with prepaid
cards. Steven Ritchie, Will Regulators Burst the Prepaid Bubble?, 9 N.C. BANKING
INST. 201, 203 (2005). Blockbuster Video joined the prepaid card system in 1996
with its gift card. Christopher B. Woods, Update on Prepaid Card Laws and
Regulations, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 815, 815 (2007). Prepaid cards are now
widely used and infiltrate various aspects of American life under the guise of phone
cards, flex spending account cards, prepaid debit cards, government benefit cards,
payroll cards, and transportation system cards to name a few. Id.
' The evolution of stored value products ("SVPs") can be traced to the advent of
digital electronic recording technologies. Gary W. Lorenz, Electronic Stored Value
Payment Systems, Market Position, and Regulatory Issues, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1177,
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broader in scope, reaching from prepaid cards honored on
traditional credit card networks, to merchant-based stored
products, to prepaid cellular service.'
Stored value products ("SVPs") intersect numerous policy
constructs. First, SVPs are primarily payment mechanisms,
touching on commercial law policies that encourage enhanced
liquidity and efficiency. 10  As a payment mechanism, the
1177-81 (1997). Categorized as either on-line or off-line, the cards are tied to a
specific cardholder with a specific amount of value placed on the card. See id. at
1178-79. The balance is magnetically recorded when purchased from a merchant
and then money can be either added through consumer pre-payment or deducted
when used for the purchase of goods or services. See id. The major difference
between a SVP that is on-line is that it is generally registered to a specific individual
and the funds applied to it are recorded in a centralized database. Id. at 1179. The
card accepting terminal and database are on-line as they are linked through a data
communications channel either permanently or minimally at the time of purchase.
Id. Starbucks and Cricket Wireless rewards cards, for instance, are examples of on-
line stored value cards. Id. Gift cards and prepaid phone cards are off-line; neither
require the cardholder to register to use the card nor provide authorization through
a personal identification number ("PIN") or other form of identification at the time of
purchase. Id. Consequentially, if lost, the money tied to the card is irretrievable. Id.
Gift cards are categorized as either open or closed loop. Sean M. Diamond,
Unwrapping Escheat: Unclaimed Property Laws and Gift Cards, 60 EMORY L.J. 971,
976 (2011). The distinct characteristics of a closed-loop card is that: (1) the card's
account is issued and maintained by a merchant; (2) the card stores a fixed
monetary amount; and (3) the card is redeemable only at the issuing retailer. Id. In
contrast, open-loop gift cards are: (1) offered by financial institutions; (2) operate
across the debit or credit card networks; and (3) can be used at any retailer that
accepts the issuer's logo-for example, Visa or MasterCard-in debit or credit card
form. Id.
The question of how to regulate SVPs faces a similar problem previous
payment innovations faced. As Clayton Gillete said in the mid-1990s, "The law of
payments, therefore, contains a puzzle. Why should regulations that govern
functionally equivalent payment devices-checks and cards-vary in both form and
substance?" Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment
Systems, 82 VA. L. REV. 181, 184 (1996).
' The relationship between the card issuer and cardholder has been described as
a contractual one; the card issuer promises to fulfill certain obligations in return for
pre-payment. Eniola Akindemowo, Contract, Deposit or E-Value? Reconsidering
Stored Value Products for a Modernized Payments Framework, 7 DEPAUL BUS. &
COM. L.J. 275, 285 (2009).
10 The preferred method of transaction for many merchants has, throughout
history, been cash. Lorenz, supra note 8, at 1178. Cash's value is known at the time
of purchase, which gives a seller confidence in it and speeds up the sale.
Convenience at checkout counters or for online payments as well as broad consumer
access further promotes the use of SVPs as a cash replacement for the consumer who
is fearful of or barred from traditional banking products due to poor credit history.
See Ari M. Cohen, Protecting the Underserved: Extending the Electronic Fund
Transfer Act and Regulation E to Prepaid Debit Cards, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 215, 224-25 (2010). Consumer confusion surrounding SVPs stems first from
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merchant serves as both intermediary and end-point recipient of
the exchange: The merchant not only accepts cash for a deferred
sale, but will eventually sell goods to the consumer by accepting
the credit the merchant holds. But despite the SVP as a
payment mechanism and the merchant as intermediary,
merchants reject the label of banking or quasi-banking as
descriptive of what they do, perhaps for good reason.' Second,
its credit card-like appearance and is further aggravated by the lack of uniformity
and protections when compared to other electronic payment products. Mark E.
Budnitz, Stored Value Cards and the Consumer: The Need for Regulation, 46 AM. U.
L. REV. 1027, 1029-35 (1997). Despite the risk of total loss of value, the confused
consumer still chooses to deal in prepaid cards because of their cash-like quality, and
merchants continue to accept them for the same reasons they accept credit cards.
John L. Douglas, Stored Value Cards: The FDIC Gets It Right, 1 ELECTRONIC
BANKING L. & COM. REP. 2 (1996).
As a result, one policy objective that payments seek to further is the near cash-
like quality of payments-also known as liquidity. See Ronald J. Mann, Searching
for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems, 44 UCLA L. REV. 951, 954 (1997)
(noting the decline in the usage of checks as a payment method). Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC") and Federal Reserve time delays have rendered the check
least attractive as a means of payment for many merchants. See L. Ali Khan, A
Theoretical Analysis of Payment Systems, 60 S.C. L. REV. 425,430 n.31 (2008).
While cash offers convenience, cash payments are not accepted online or by
mail; and while cash offers anonymity, there are instances, such as for high value
transactions, where a purchase trail is preferable. See Zywicki, supra note 3, at 85.
Likewise, consumers do not generally want to carry around large amounts of cash
for obvious reasons, such as loss or theft. See generally id. Conveniences like direct
deposit often times alleviate the need to make a trip to the bank, and so many
workers never physically handle paychecks or the money they are worth. See
generally Building a Better Bank Card: Reaching the Unbanked with Stored Value
Cards, supra note 6. SVPs help to expedite the trust between merchant and
consumer; whether issued by the retailer itself or backed by Visa or MasterCard, the
obligation of payment shifts from the cardholder to the card issuer. Electronic
currency serves to keep the wheels of commerce churning as if cash money was
actually being used while simultaneously reducing the risk taken by both buyer and
seller. The efficiency of stored value cards is that the value transfers to the
merchant as cash payments. Douglas, supra. Ironically, checking remains a vital
source of assets for poorer populations because of the certainty that government
checks offer cashers of those checks. See Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE
J. ON REG. 121, 134 (2004).
11 Merchants using SVPs reject the label of banking for two primary reasons:
(1) the implication that the merchant may be required to insure "deposits" by
customers; and (2) the possibility that the merchant may be required to maintain
certain amounts of funds as a fiduciary of customers, cutting off the possibility of
leveraging those assets. See Akindemowo, supra note 9, at 289. For that reason,
merchants like Starbucks and Cricket Wireless make clear in their terms and
conditions that they are not maintaining 'deposits" nor insuring amounts held by
consumers; they also make clear that they are not engaged in the act of banking.
Merchants' desire to avoid categorizing the receipts for SVPs from consumers
as deposits can be seen clearly in the most recent general counsel opinion for the
20141
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SVPs are largely consumer products marketed to consumers for
the purpose of purchasing other consumer products.12 Third,
SVPs intersect questions of economic access and social mobility,
FDIC. See General Counsel's Opinion No. 8-Insurability of Funds Underlying
Stored Value Cards and Other Nontraditional Access Mechanisms, FED. DEPOSIT
INS. CORP., httpsJ/www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5500-500.html (last updated
Apr. 20, 2014). In it, the general counsel distinguishes between open-loop and closed-
loop SVP programs for the purposes of when program operators are required to pay
insurance deposits. Id. Because funds underlying open-loop SVPs are "deposits"
under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act ("FDI Act"), the insured financial
institution holding such deposits must pay federal deposit insurance on the same.
See id. Moreover, since 2008, the premiums for such deposits have increased,
providing more incentive for merchants to avoid being characterized as either an
open-loop SVP under the current scheme or, more to the point, being characterized
as receiving deposits under the FDI Act, regardless of whether it operates an open-
loop or closed-loop program. Starbucks and Cricket Wireless would be deemed to be
closed-loop programs under the FDI Act.
Likewise, merchants desire to avoid the characterization of what they are
doing as banking because it may trigger fiduciary duties to the consumer. The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") does not deem SVP issuers to be
engaged in banking with cardholders in part because of the anonymity involved and
untraceable nature of the transactions. Akindemowo, supra note 9, at 289. Financial
institutions have a fiduciary duty to a depositor to provide account records unlike its
SVP counterpart, which only has to track card balances. Id. The banking institution
also owes its depositor a duty to secure the funds through deposit insurance. Id. at
277.
12 Retailer-issued SVPs give consumers a card that operates much like a credit
card, but instead of incurring debt through its usage, the card accesses funds
already paid until they are depleted. The cardholder can obtain all of the benefits of
electronic payments without the intervening of a depository institution or a
satisfactory credit score. Though run like a credit card, this card's function is more
like that of a traveler's check or money order; it transmits all of the benefits of using
cash onto a magnetic strip held on a plastic card. Lorenz, supra note 8, at 1178. SVP
funds are pre-payments, not deposits, under the FDIC. The FDIC classifies SVPs as
closed-loop cards because, when used, the merchant is not paid through a traditional
pooled account at a depository institution. Rather, the funds already belong to the
merchant. John Douglas et al., New General Counsel's Opinion No. 8: The FDIC
Provides Clarity on Deposit Insurance and Assessments on Funds Underlying Stored
Value Cards, 126 BANKING L.J. 234, 236 (2009).
A majority of prepaid cards function as one-time purchases or at least until the
money is drained from their accounts. Many SVP cards can be reloaded so that the
cards are used again and again. What is more, is that some cards, like pre-paid debit
cards, can offer access to cash through automated teller machines ("ATMs"). The
emergence of this type of SVP has many in the legal community questioning the
applicability of current financial laws to SVPs. Aside from the FDIC regulations
designed to protect consumers, which non-bank financial service companies can
escape, the security of SVPs in comparison to traditional banks is virtually non-
existant. DANIEL R. MURRAY ET AL., 2A ILLINOIS PRACTICE: UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE WITH ILLINOIS CODE COMMENTS art. 4 (2012).
[Vol. 88:39
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perhaps raising a specter of consumption gentrification.13 As
more and more consumers from different social dimensions use
SVPs, questions arise about whether existing remedies available
to consumers adequately address the various competing policies
triggered by the use of SVPs. 14
13 This Article offers a term of art to the emerging multi-dimensional economy
that consumers find themselves within. Consumption gentrification, as defined here,
is the access of consumers to markets targeted towards a different economic base.
For example, the consumer that typically would select a contract-based cell phone,
who instead opts for a monthly prepaid phone, or the consumer who falls outside of
the typical Starbucks market because the consumer's income is below that targeted,
who, nevertheless, enjoys a spice latte occasionally. Gentrification as a concept has
generally been associated with the process "by which working class residential
neighborhoods are rehabilitated by middle class homebuyers, landlords, and
professional developers." Neil Smith, Gentrification and Uneven Development, 58
ECON. GEOGRAPHY 139, 139 n.1 (1982). Gentrification as an analogy is interesting
because it challenges our normal assumptions regarding the development of
consumer products. As one geographer noted about gentrification of neighborhoods,
it "undermines the dominant assumption that filtering is a uni-directional
downwards process in which lower income groups move into progressively
deteriorated housing." Chris Hamnett, The Blind Men and the Elephant: The
Explanation of Gentrification, 16 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 173, 173
(1991).
14 The unbanked and under-banked are the target market for SVP sales and it
is presumed "because of the presumable socioeconomic differences" that SVP
cardholders are less financially sound and educated than the average credit
cardholder. Arnold S. Rosenberg, Better than Cash? Global Proliferation of Payment
Cards and Consumer Protection Policy, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 426, 455
(2006). Moreover, many of the issues for which consumers would need adequate
remedies result from fees incurred by failure to maintain an adequate balance or
from fees applied from non-use or reactivation. MURRAY ET AL., supra note 12.
Insolvency also threatens the cardholder who is less than vigilant in verifying the
financial soundness of the card issuer. A less sophisticated consumer base would be
less apt to investigate a card issuer's financial security. Further adding to the
detriment of the SVP consumer who is unprepared for a legal battle is the issue of
jurisdiction, which could prevent a low-income consumer from seeking relief at all.
Budnitz, supra note 10, at 1036.
Low-income, unbanked and under-banked consumers, and young adults are
the targeted demographic for SVP purchases. Cohen, supra note 10, at 215.
Inexperience with banking or a bad banking history can prevent people from holding
bank accounts. Also, low-income workers often cannot wait for a check to clear and
have trouble maintaining a minimum balance and avoiding overdraft fees. Id. at
217. The allure of electronic payments is that SVPs function like credit cards
without the burden of having a bank account, high credit score, or employment.
Rosenberg, supra, at 429.
Many of the first SVPs to hit the market were in the form of campus cards for
entering college students and now are often used to allow the "unbanked" to make
online purchases and facilitate faster purchases at checkout counters. Additionally,
prepaid debit cards act like credit cards with training wheels for many teens and
young adults learning to balance a budget. Ritchie, supra note 7, at 207-08.
2014]
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Indeed, despite the growth of SVPs as a payment option
across multiple social strata, the remedies available to
consumers when the payment option fails remain rather limited.
Some existing remedies, which are tied to commercial law
structures, fail to address the full complement of issues that
consumers using SVPs face.1" For example, a consumer that
funds a SVP with either a debit card or a credit card may have
remedies that arise under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act
("EFTA") 6 or the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 7 respectively.
But, the availability of remedies under EFTA and TILA are, in
fact, quite limited to the initial transfer of funds aspect of the
transaction. 8 They do not account for problems that arise from
improper depletion of funds after the initial funding transaction
has taken place, nor do they afford the consumer a remedy if the
merchant simply fails to honor the SVP based on a purported
1" For example, SVP users run the risk of electronic malfunction, issuer
solvency, privacy breach, loss, theft, and so forth, which may not be remedied under
existing electronic payments law. See Budnitz, supra note 10, at 1036-37. The risks
are identical to those incurred by credit card users, except where SVPs are
concerned, the cardholder is not protected from the failings of the systems by which
it runs. MURRAY ET AL., supra note 12.
16 15 U.S.C. § 1693g (2012) (limiting consumer liability to fifty dollars or the
amount reasonably to be avoided when reported to the banking institution and only
where the card was unauthorized); 12 C.F.R. § 205.6 (2014) (implementing
regulations relating to EFTA's statutory limitation).
17 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (2012) (limiting liability for fraudulent consumer
transactions to fifty dollars upon the consumer's appropriate notice to the credit card
intermediary). The federal Truth in Lending Act limits the amount in unauthorized
charges a credit cardholder can be held liable for fifty dollars or less, provided the
cardholder notifies the issuer of fraudulent activity within two days. Daniel M.
Mroz, Credit or Debit? Unauthorized Use and Consumer Liability Under Federal
Consumer Protection Legislation, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 589, 595 (1999).
'" "Unlike credit and debit cards, prepaid debit cards are not protected by
consumer liability caps or a right of recredit." Cohen, supra note 10, at 227 (footnote
ommitted). Debit cardholders run the risk of losing more of their money to fraud, but
in many cases banks provide the same limits that credit cards carry. See id.
Regulation E of EFTA aims to protect consumers who use electronic payment
systems; however, it does not cover stored value cards under $100, which allows
issuers to circumvent disclosure requirements that credit and debit cardholders are
entitled to distribute. John L. Douglas, Technology & Banking, 1 N.C. BANKING
INST. 37, 52 (1997). The standard disclosures involve system structure details,
security risks, and forfeiture risks due to loss, theft, or insolvency. Id. The variety
and complexity of fee structures that accompany merchant cards further complicates
consumer issues and supports the need for more protection. Cohen, supra note 10, at
227-28. Essentially, consumers who need the most protection are getting the least
by relying on prepaid cards to access their money. See Budnitz, supra note 10, at
1031.
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dispute within the merchant's terms and conditions. For
consumers, drawing the distinction between transactions
involving their credit or debits cards-one form of electronic
transaction-and those involving SVPs may seem quite
tenuous.' 9
Besides the gaps that exist in complimentary regulatory
schemes, other remedies also fail to adequately address
consumer needs upon merchant failure. If, for example, the
merchant decides that the terms and conditions of its SVP do not
require the merchant to perform in the same manner that the
consumers believe themselves entitled, there is little legal
incentive for the merchant to act in a manner that is conciliatory
towards the consumers. The consumers could attempt to enforce
the terms and conditions of the contract, but likely face the often-
practical hurdle that the costs of their actions are more costly
than the value of the money they store with the merchant in the
first place.2° Additionally, the Federal Class Action Fairness Act
19 To the consumer, SVPs often look and function identically to their credit or
debit card transactions, causing some scholars to suggest that it would seem
reasonable for the consumer to expect prepaid cards to carry the same security and
liability safeguards as their plastic cousins. Budnitz, supra note 10, at 1031-32.
20 The costs of pursuing consumer claims has been well documented in a
number of consumer law areas. See, e.g., David A. Rice, Product Quality Laws and
the Economics of Federalism, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 46 (1985) (consumer product
deficiency); Saami Zain, Regulation of E-Commerce by Contract: Is It Fair to
Consumers?, 31 UWLA L. REV. 163, 169 (2000) (e-commerce). The sophisticated
consumer is just as likely to avoid litigation for payments lost as the socially or
economically disadvantaged consumer because of the imbalance of loss and the cost
of taking legal action. Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss
Allocation for Consumer Payments, 66 TEX. L. REV. 63, 81-82 (1987). Class action
suits have traditionally been a way around the fear many have of fighting a legal
battle against a corporate giant; it cuts costs tremendously for the plaintiff who has
suffered a small loss, making litigation a reasonable option, and it provides the
deterrence for unfair business practices that individual action spurs. Michael C.
Duffy, Comment, Making Waives: Reining in Class Action Waivers in Consumer
Contracts of Adhesion, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 847, 865 (2007). Class action waivers are
becoming prevalent in contracts between consumers and their credit lenders and
banks, in effect, disabling any method of recovery. Id. at 850.
Another more direct example is the dichotomy between the costs of prepaid
phone cards and the costs of legal action. Prepaid phone cards are a highly sought
after SVP on the market today; in 2002, long-distance calling cards accounted for
more than $3.6 billion in sales. Mark E. Budnitz et al., Deceptive Claims for Prepaid
Telephone Cards and the Need for Regulation, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 1
(2006). Most troublesome, though, is a lack of regulation and non-existing or
misleading information about fees and usage available to the consumer. Id. at 2.
Many low-income immigrants rely on prepaid cards to call their native countries,
which costs more money than they expected because of the non-disclosure of
2014]
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passed in 2005 raises the criteria for class action eligibility,
perhaps forestalling collective action once seen as a solution to
the low-value plaintiff, and thus makes it less likely that
consumers will seek to litigate the terms and conditions of their
SVP agreements. 21 And even when the consumers can enforce
the terms of the contract, they often find themselves in a forum
pre-selected by the merchant, absorbing costs the merchant is
more prepared to absorb, and in a process which the merchant is
more prepared to navigate.22
additional international charges. Id. While most cost as little as ten dollars, for
repeat customers on small margin budgets, the value can be a significant cost for
their household budget. Id. at 2-3. Because prepaid calling cards tend to take
advantage of vulnerable consumers, who based on their legal status in the U.S. are
less likely to press legal claims they might have, the calling card industry is a prime
example of consumer SVPs where few remedies prevail. See id.
21 See Howard M. Erichson, CAFA's Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA.
L. REV. 1593, 1593 (2008); see also, e.g., Preira v. Bancorp Bank, 885 F. Supp. 2d 672,
679, 681-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (denying certification of class action for gift card fee
litigation).
22 Seeking relief is often nixed by arbitration clauses, and financing litigation
may be too burdensome, especially when the value lost on an SVP is far less than
the cost to hire a lawyer. Budnitz et al., supra note 20, at 3. Moreover, many SVP
contracts contain class action prohibitions. Id. Arbitration clauses have nestled into
many consumer contracts for the sole purpose of preventing class action suits by
limiting complainants to settle their disputes individually and, thus, eliminating
many small claims from ever arising. Jane K. Winn, Electronic Commerce Law: 2001
Developments, 57 BUS. LAW. 541, 568 (2001).
The cost for the SVP issuer to defend a claim would be significantly
disproportionate as well to the value at issue. Most gift cards, for instance, carry no
more than $56.20 at any given time, according to averages collected by First Data in
2006; a Discover Card survey calculated the average value to be forty-six dollars.
Woods, supra note 7, at 830. Merchants make money from the sale of gift cards and
can ensure that every dime stored on the card is spent at the store-most merchants
do not give customers cash back if less than the value on the card is spent at the
store. Ritchie, supra note 7, at 203. Additionally, merchants use the cards to track
customer spending habits and loyalty. Id. The benefits for the retailer who issues
prepaid cards are not transferable, though, to bank issuers not engaged in selling
goods or services in exchange for the value stored on the card. Banks earn one dollar
in pre-tax net income on each fifty dollars prepaid card sold, while their merchant
counterparts earn seven dollars-much of the difference in profit is on account of
consumers spending more than the redeemable value on a merchant's SVP. MARK
FURLETrI, PREPAID CARDS: How Do THEY FUNCTION? How ARE THEY REGULATED?
9 (2004), available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/consumer-credit-and-
payments/payment-cards-center/events/conferences/2004/PrepaidCards_062004.pdf.
To make SVPs profitable, banks introduced activation, service, maintenance, and
other fees. See id. While the fees equate consumer forfeiture, the cards offer more
protection from fraud and loss than merchant issued cards. Ritchie, supra note 7, at
206. But because the cards are not big money-makers for banks that issue them,
adding costly litigation to the mix would drive up the risk incurred by issuers,
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Just as problematic as the merchant that decides to dishonor
its terms and conditions is the merchant that can no longer honor
its terms and conditions because it is insolvent. Perhaps just as
illusory as the potential for litigating terms and conditions
against merchants is the priority that consumers enjoy should
the merchant file for bankruptcy protection. Specifically, the
Bankruptcy Code provides for a priority for:
[Unsecured claims of individuals, to the extent of $2,775 for
each such individual, arising from the deposit, before the
commencement of the [Bankruptcy] case, of money in
connection with the purchase, lease, or rental of property, or the
purchase of services, for the personal, family, or household use
of such individuals that were not delivered or provided.23
That priority is seventh in the list of claims allowed by the
Bankruptcy Code.24 Moreover, the consumers' priority is limited
possibly to the point of driving the products into extinction. Id. SVPs arguably allow
financial institutions to tap into the multi-million dollars worth of spending power
generated by young Americans, establishing relationships early on with twelve to
nineteen year-olds that may be potential banking customers. Id. at 207-08. Another
sizeable market banks attempt to reach through SVPs is the estimated nine million
American households that do not hold bank accounts and another twenty-one
million under-banked Americans, according to 2009 figures. FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP., FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 15
(2009), available at http://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2009/full-report.pdf.
However vast the demographic for SVPs, the irregular and often misleading terms
and conditions the cards carry that result in lost value for the ill-informed
cardholder can further deter consumers from trusting banks. Cohen, supra note 10,
at 217-18. Furthermore, little incentive, such as high returns, exists for banks to
specifically target underserved consumers so that they will likely become traditional
account holders, and so many low- to moderate-income earners with spotty financial
histories are simply substituting financial services with prepaid products. Id. The
notion that prepaid cards help transition unbanked and under-banked consumers to
financially served ones is disputed precisely because of complex fee structures that
accompany SVPs and further fuel distrust of financial institutions. See id.
22 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7), (d) (2012). Of course the Bankruptcy Code's reference to
deposited value does not infer a deposit relationship under the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act.
24 Id. § 507(a)(7). Other claims that precede the consumer priority are claims
for: (1) domestic support obligations; (2) administrative claims on behalf of the
Bankruptcy estate; (3) claims by creditors that arise in the ordinary course of the
debtor's business after the commencement of the bankruptcy case, but before the
appointment of an administrator over the bankruptcy estate; (4) claims up to
$12,475 for salary or benefit related compensation up to 180 days prior to the
Bankruptcy petition; (5) unsecured claims for contributions to an employee benefit
plan; and (6) claims by certain types of merchants engaged in agricultural
production. Id. § 507(a)(1)-(6).
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to $2,775 of value stored prior to the commencement of the
bankruptcy case.25
Even with the consumers' priority in bankruptcy, the
consumers' ability to recapture the value they have deposited
with the merchant is subject to numerous obstacles. First, the
merchant likely has used its cash receipts as security for other
lenders.26  Also, even if the merchant elects to reorganize, the
consumers' ability to access stored value may be significantly
limited. For example, in a recent bankruptcy court decision
involving Sharper Image stored value cards, the bankruptcy
court approved Sharper Image's plan to limit consumers' use of
the card to purchases in which the value of the transaction was
for double the value of the card.27 A merchant could elect to
require consumers to choose between filing a claim under the
priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code or accepting the new
terms for use of the card value. Thus, in a way, the merchant of
SVPs has become "thick as thieves" with the legal ambiguities
around the product, leaving the consumer contemplating the
price they paid and the merchant that dared to bite the hand
that fed them.28
Overlaying these lapses is the inherent inequity that is
created by an SVP closed-loop system in which a consumer is
deprived of a forum for a remedy, a serious legal remedy, and a
legal system willing to determine the risk based on economic
absorption. Legal economists might argue that SVPs do not have
25 Id. § 507(a)(7).
26 See generally id. Under Article 9, the type of collateral that SVPs represent
are payment intangibles. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(61) ("'Payment intangible' means a
general intangible under which the account debtor's principal obligation is a
monetary obligation."). Payment intangibles may be used as security under Article 9.
Id. § 9-102(a)(12)(B).
27 In re Sharper Image Corp., No. 08-10322 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del.). Following
backlash from the National Association of Attorneys General and other consumer
advocacy groups, Sharper Image withdrew its plan to honor gift cards under a
modified plan. Thomas 0. Bean et al., Gaining Support from All of Your
Constituencies, 071008 ABI-CLE 301 (July 10, 2008).
1 Natalie Merchant, Thick as Thieves, on OPHELIA (Elektra 1998). Retailers
face unique challenges in meeting federal and state requirements when filing for
bankruptcy while simultaneously trying to preserve customer relationships. Lisa M.
Schweitzer & Humayun Khalid, Retailer Bankruptcies: A Primer, 4 PRATt'S J.
BANKR. L. 641, 647 (2008). On one hand, merchants have to gain court approval to
honor gift cards during bankruptcy, and on the other, some state laws prohibit them
from not honoring gift cards. Id. A retailer who strips its customers of their stored




a substantial individual impact on a consumer to warrant
collective action.29 However, this Article suggests that the value
of the SVP program is in the transition of the consumer from an
individual to an aggregate lender-with all of the other
consumers who maintain SVPs with a merchant. In this way,
the transaction is not merely a question of $100 on a single SVP
product, but rather the aggregate of consumers who have loaned
the merchant as much as $1 billion in a given year.30
Complicating these scenarios is the scenario in which the
merchant is prominently placed in the transaction holding many
roles. The merchant is the seller, the payment intermediary, and
29 Legal economists tend to share the view that agreements between private
parties have a way of shaping themselves to be economically beneficial absent any
legal intervention. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 20, at 68. However, when the
sophistication of contracting entities is so imbalanced as to cut off negotiating power
of the consumer, market failure results. Id. Consumer payments are particularly
vulnerable to market failure because of the disparate economic positions between
SVP issuer and holder. Id. The consumer's lack of information regarding risk
allocation and other "technical, obscure elements of the contract" they enter in a
consumer payments agreement further leads to market failure. Id. at 70. Legal rules
governing liability for losses are too complex for the average consumer and even
more so for the average SVP holder to successfully bargain for if given the
opportunity. Id. This imbalance of information and power perpetuates market
failure and "presents the strongest case for [legal] intervention in the market." Id.
Thus, the remedies for the prepaid consumer who suffers a loss, however
intermittent it may seem in the marketplace, are not being addressed through the
status quo negotiations between consumers and the financial institutions and
merchants that issue SVPs. Id.
10 An analogy to the economic balancing of class action lawsuits is appropriate
here. As Susan P. Koniak and George M. Cohen wrote:
In the class action context, the Court's argument makes sense. Class
actions that aggregate small claims, by grouping cases together, create
economic incentives to bring cases that would be uneconomical if filed
individually. These class actions do not necessarily displace competition
that would otherwise exist; rather, they make possible claims that would
otherwise not be brought. There is no competition for bringing
uneconomical cases.
Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV.
1051, 1204 (1996).
When considering the value of transactions that Starbucks has received from
consumers, the aggregate amount more than raises the specter of collective action,
while individually, the value pales. Starting in 2001, the Starbucks loyalty card
program resulted in more than $1 billion in total sales by 2004; in 2007 alone, the
company sold more than $1 billion in Starbucks cards, though the individual
consumer may only have on average less than fifty dollars loaded at any given time.
See PHILIP KEITEL, FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE PREPAID CARD INDUSTRY: COSTS,
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the debtor. In short, the SVP transaction places the merchant
and consumer in a relationship where no clear body of law
defines their obligations to one another. These ambiguities and
lapses in legal remedies shaping SVPs become more nuanced
when considering the different stakes consumers bring to the
money storage game. One highly attractive feature of SVPs is
that they have managed to cross economic dividing lines where
other money products have not.3 1 For example, banking accounts
notoriously underserve impoverished populations, who prefer to
deal in cash, rather than trust their money to banks to hold for
them.2 Credit cards have become more difficult to obtain since
the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act
of 2009 ("Credit CARD Act"), but even before then, access to
credit lines seemed to have a "redline" limitation to them; thus,
since 2009, what has changed about access to credit cards is not
the role of potential, but the point at which potential may be fully
realized in the form of credit worthiness.33 SVPs, on the other
31 The gap between the credit and debit cardholder and the consumer who is
unable to gain credit is widening rather than narrowing today. For the low-income
consumers with dismal credit history, even if able to gain credit, would be subject to
high interest rates and behavior-based fees. Todd J. Zywicki, Consumer Use and
Government Regulation of Title Pledge Lending, 22 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 425, 440
(2010).
32 Prepaid products are increasingly popular among low- to moderate-income
earners who lack the creditworthiness needed to hold a credit card or bank account.
Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 429. Employers do not pay wages in cash and so payroll
cards, for instance, are a way for the unbanked worker to get around having to pay
check-cashing fees, while still maintaining the liquidity of cash in practical terms.
Id. Payroll cards function much like the debit card in that an employer can deposit
funds to the card that the employee can then access with the swipe of the card at
any retailer that accepts electronic payments. Id.
33 Market failure in the global credit arena led to sweeping regulation of the
industry by way of congressional intervention. Zachary J. Luck, Essay, Bringing
Change to Credit Cards: Did the Credit CARD Act Create a New Era of Federal
Credit Card Consumer Protection?, 5 HARv. L. & POLy REV. 205, 205 (2011). The
Credit CARD Act forced credit card issuers to implement disclosure-oriented and
substantive regulations. Id. at 211. Among other consumer protections, the Credit
CARD Act: (1) banned credit lenders from raising interest rates without notice;
(2) capped late and over-the-limit fees and banned inactivity fees; (3) required
issuers to include disclosures with the calculated number of months it would take to
pay off the debt if only making minimum required payments; and (4) limited credit
extension to adults under twenty-one years of age. Id. at 209-12.
The Credit CARD Act was extended to cover gift cards but only banned
service, inactivity, and dormancy fees. Cohen, supra note 10, at 229. Expiration
dates of less than five years after issuance are also prohibited by the Credit CARD
Act. 10A FREDERICK H. MILLER & SARAH JANES HUGHES, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE SERIES § 2:20 (2013). The Credit CARD Act enacted by Congress suggests a
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hand, enjoy a prominent place amongst both the mainstream
economy users and those that sit outside the mainstream in the
poorer echelons.34
And as the SVP has infiltrated different economic echelons of
our social fabric, consideration of adequate relief must take into
account the different stakes to consumers when the law does not
afford an appropriate remedy. For example, the fact that
consumers cannot purchase $4.00 lattes from Starbucks with
SVPs might not motivate collective action, whereas consumers
that lose access to their pre-paid cellular service may well urge a
broader collective response. At issue is an often discussed, but
rarely implemented, concern for access to social mobility-at
least rarely implemented in the commercial law context. 6
This Article engages how those social considerations interact
with commercial contracting principles and payments policies to
recognition that traditional checks and balances that are supposedly inherent in the
bargaining process breaks down when the unsophisticated consumer is matched up
against the payments industry. See Peter A. Alces, Guerilla Terms, 56 EMORY L.J.
1511, 1514 (2007).
31 SVP's widespread popularity is especially visible during the holiday season.
In 2006, a survey conducted by the National Retailers Foundation found that
seventy-nine percent of consumers planned to purchase at least one gift card. John
T. Albers, Stored Value Cards: Should We Know the Holder?, 11 N.C. BANKING INST.
363,368 (2007).
35 Case-by-case litigation has historically been the way the common law governs
payment devices, but the typically low value held on SVPs coupled with the typically
less sophisticated consumer makes the normally sluggish process a virtually non-
existent one. Gregory E. Maggs, New Payment Devices and General Principles of
Payment Law, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 753, 776 (1997). The low value of most SVPs
makes litigation largely unwarranted, and added to that hurdle is the jurisdictional
inconsistencies likely to follow due to various state laws and card structures. Id.
36 To address the lack of redress, the Federal Reserve Board ("FRB") proposed in
1997 that Regulation E be expanded to cover prepaid cards that have the ability to
store more than $100 at a time, noting that losing that amount of money is not a
significant setback to the individual consumer. Budnitz, supra note 10, at 1043.
However, as Budnitz's article suggests, to the unemployed, minimum-wage earner,
or person living paycheck-to-paycheck, that loss can be the difference between
paying rent or fixing a broken down car needed to get to work; the loss can
essentially stop social mobility in its tracks. Id. at 1043-44.
Regulation E was extended in 2006 to include protections for payroll cards
because people's livelihoods are dependent on the value stored on them. Cohen,
supra note 10, at 232. Holders of other prepaid cards are not so protected from
liability, in part, because of the "relatively small monetary amounts involved."
Budnitz, supra note 10, at 1028. Still, the law affords the SVP holder no shield
against loss no matter how much money is at stake. Anita Ramasastry, Confusion
and Convergence in Consumer Payments: Is Coherence in Error Resolution
Appropriate?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 813, 817 (2008) (noting that even cards with
large balances are not regulated by the Federal Reserve).
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recommend an over-arching narrative of fairness. At the core is
the desire to create balance amongst the competing interests,
while recognizing the role that risk and access should play in
defining the legal remedies available to consumers. To do so, the
Article attempts to understand the competing interests
represented by different constituents of SVPs, including
consumers and merchants. In particular, the Article attempts to
tell a story of two different types of consumers. The first is one
whom we might not care much about, except that we likely
identify more closely with this one than the other.3 The other is
one whom we should care about but whose interests are rarely
protected adequately, and to be sure, when they are protected, it
is not without a significant costA8
Part I describes how these two consumer archetypes blur
together-largely through consumption gentrification. 9
Consumption gentrification is the availability of consumers at
different economic strata to purchase the same or similar
products. 40  For example, consumption gentrification would
recognize the phenomenon of a high-income earner choosing to
use pre-paid cellular service, traditionally a service targeted
towards low-income earners; on the other side, consumption
gentrification recognizes that low-income earners may be as
likely to purchase high-priced coffee from Starbucks as high-
income earners. Because of that blurring, this Article suggests
31 Structure schemes of prepaid cards differ depending on the card issuer; the
prepaid cardholder is equally diverse. Cohen, supra note 10, at 226-27. One
constant, though, is consumer confusion. Ramasastry, supra note 36, at 815. At
present, error resolution statutes that govern debit and credit cards do not exist to
cover SVPs. Id. High-earning consumers who fully participate in the banking realm
and hold credit cards are just as likely to fall victim to loss and also to mistakenly
assume they are protected from liability due to expectations sprung from long-term
use of other electronic payment products. Id. at 834.
38 Regulating the prepaid industry would not be without compliance costs.
KEITEL, supra note 30, at 5. Meeting the requirements, which may involve actions
such as replacing existing cards with new ones containing mandatory print, etc., can
be an expensive undertaking. Id. Any added costs will inevitably result in a dip in
profits, which card issuers will then pass on to the consumer or will ultimately get
out of the prepaid industry altogether. Id.
3' The widespread availability and non-discriminatory access to SVPs melds
shoppers of all economic statuses into one card-carrying consumer. Cohen, supra
note 10, at 221. Low-income and unbanked consumers who use SVPs as an entry-
level banking product may only further blur the line between traditional banking,
distinguished by a fiduciary relationship, and the contractual relationship between




that policy considerations should not limit their reach by
judgments of purchase propriety. In short, we should not care
because someone cannot buy a $4.00 latte; rather we should care
because someone did not receive the benefit of her bargain-a
principle that stretches across all economic strata. Instead, we
should consider whether the nature of the transaction is fair,
regardless of economic strata, and: (1) whether the parties can
bargain effectively to mitigate risk; or (2) whether the law
adequately protects parties who cannot effectively bargain to
mitigate risk.
Reconciling these social constructs against the legal
remedies currently available to consumers suggests significant
imbalance in the relationship that merchants and consumers
share to SVPs. These imbalances are, frankly, nothing new in
the consumer arena.41 We have claimed policies that purport to
afford consumers greater access, which actually create far
greater costs to those whom the bargain is intended to benefit.42
Often times, the contractual paradigms serve as barriers to
consumer remedies because we do not adequately take into
account the different expectations that merchants and consumers
bring to the bargain. Instead of allocating risk along boundaries
of fairness, we have constructed poor substitutes for fairness, like
the notion of adhesion, which looks to whether the merchant's
41 Today's consumers are not contracting at all when they sign on the dotted
line, accepting the terms and conditions carefully crafted by the legally-backed
mega-merchant; the consumers just know they want the product or service, have to
comply with the terms to get it, and hope all goes well. Katherine R. Guerin, Clash
of the Federal Titans: The Federal Arbitration Act vs. the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act. Will the Consumer Win or Lose?, 13 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 4, 4 (2001). "The
vast majority of successful unconscionability claims involve poor, often
unsophisticated, consumers challenging oppressive adhesion contracts foisted on
them by retail merchants or credit sellers." Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein,
When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 48 (2000). Middle class complainants have been less
successful in unconscionability claims, suggesting that the courts expect more
financially adept consumers to protect themselves against contractual abuse. Id.
42 Prepaid products do not discriminate; the consumer with unstable income or
employment is no less able to obtain an SVP than the high-income, home-owning
consumer. Zywicki, supra note 31, at 440. However, the less sophisticated consumers
who utilize prepaid products because they are barred from accessing credit have
little legal recourse if they suffered a loss. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 20, at 80. The
high cost of litigation and often low monetary value at stake forces the low-income
target demographic for prepaid payment products to absorb their own loss with no
consequence on the part of the issuer. Id.
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terms were ambiguous but not to whether the substance of the
transaction was fair.
Part II describes how commercial law remedies are shaped
across three different paradigms-time, action, and risk. When
we understand that the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC")
adopts these paradigms, not as substitutes for fairness, but as
ways of measuring fairness, we can foresee a policy framework
that helps narrate how the substance of new transaction types fit
into broader ends of commercial trade. Because SVPs represent
merchant-buyer, payor-payee, and creditor-debtor relationships,
Part II will show how these concepts infiltrate all three types of
commercial transactions. The time paradigm reflects the
commercial choice to acknowledge the availability of certain
remedies before the loss-causing event, while others are not
known until the actor has suffered a loss. The action paradigm is
reflected in the policy choices in which we sometimes require
actors to take some affirmative action to obtain a specific
remedy43; other times, it requires actors to do nothing44; and in
certain circumstances, it disables other parties' remedies, despite
the affirmative actions they have taken, according to our sense of
broadly shaped public policies. Lastly, the risk paradigm is
reflected in ways in which actors are forced to internalize certain
levels of risk before a remedy may be made available to them.
For example, the UCC creates frameworks for acceptable risks
for parties to undertake and unacceptable risks which the UCC
would not impose on a party. Importantly, each of these concepts
that form the ground floor of merchant-buyer and creditor-lender
relationships is founded on notions of fairness and the inequity of
hidden knowledge.
But just as merchant interests should be balanced against
consumer interests, any remedy that would reshape SVPs should
be considered in light of broader commercial considerations upon
43 The classic example is a litigant that is forced to front his own costs to bring a
legal action. Commercial policy reflects certain policy choices where parties are
required to take certain actions before being afforded a remedy. For example, the
filing of a financing statement under Article 9 is an affirmative act that creditors
must undertake to obtain a security interest.
" Consumer protections expanded in 1966 with the adoption of "opt-out" class
actions. Milton Handler & Michael D. Blechman, Antitrust and the Consumer
Interest: The Fallacy of Parens Patriae and a Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L.J.
626, 627 (1976). Members of the identified class in a plaintiffs complaint were
automatically included but retained the option to withdraw from the class. Id.
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which we rely. In short, because SVPs are a growing source of
payment for consumers and are used by merchants to encourage
greater consumption, they should be considered with broader
policy objectives relating to payments. Specifically, the remedies
that should be available to consumers should be weighed against
their propensity to encourage liquidity and efficiency in payment
transactions. Thus, Part II also considers how these payment
policies are revealed to construct a payments system.
Part III then considers three different types of remedies that
may be available to consumers in a SVP transaction that would
offer a more fair balancing of interests between merchants and
consumers: (1) require SVP merchants to insure deposits held by
consumers-the FDIC model; (2) grant an automatic security
interest to consumers who register their SVP with the merchant;
and (3) disable other security interests to the extent that the
merchant has outstanding value held as a SVP. Considering
these remedies through the lens of commercial and payments
policies reveals a contradicting problem of having to pick and
choose the ill to be remedied. The Article ends by suggesting
that such a scenario warrants a more comprehensive approach,
which can only be achieved through federal regulatory oversight.
In such a scenario, a regulatory agency is in the best position to
craft reasonable approaches that do not leave consumers subject
to ill-bargained-for terms and merchant solvency.
Understanding the overlap of existing policies-social,
contracting, and payment-will minimize our tendency to reduce
questions of fairness to Coasian bargains.45 By reconsidering the
41 The fairness of the bargain dissolves when parties' interests conflict in the
sense that one party-the card issuer-is made better off only through making the
other-the cardholder-worse off, and the further the two are apart on the loss-
benefit spectrum, the bigger the profits. Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law &
Economics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 293, 296 (1992). The Coase Theorum relies on the
notion that private bargaining results in more benefits, more stability, and more
efficiency in free market economies. Id. at 297. But a products payment issuer is not
truly a private bargainer, nor is the transaction costless, in that it spends ample
resources in contract formation suitable for the masses. Myriam Gilles, Opting Out
of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104
MICH. L. REV. 373, 398 (2005). Only by joining forces in negotiations-in the
aggregate-will the consumer's needs be better met through a leveling of sorts
between the divide in power to manipulate the terms of a contract. Hovenkamp,
supra, at 335. Thus, the notion that the cost of transacting is zero, and the
bargaining process will lead to balanced positions on both sides of the contract, does
not necessarily hold true in transactions between the consumer and credit lender.
Id. at 296.
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role of the merchant and the consumer within the transaction,
we are forced to look beyond the formal labels we have
collectively attached, and which merchants have voluntarily
accepted, and delve into the core nature of the transaction.46 For
instance, recognizing that these transactions represent multiple
aligned, unsecured creditors lending money to merchants at rates
no institutional lender would consider, reiterates the inequity
that current remedies available to consumers belie.47  The fact
that the merchant is given the benefit of an unsecured loan, for
which it neither risks its current assets nor its future longevity,
should also make us ponder why the consumer who bears all the
risk has only illusory remedies to fall back upon.
46 Perhaps no other legal discipline embraces legal realism like commercial law.
For example, Karl Lewellyn famously noted:
Ferment is abroad in the law. The sphere of interest widens; men become
interested again in the life that swirls around things legal. Before rules,
were facts; in the beginning was not a Word, but a Doing. Behind decisions
stand judges; judges are men; as men they have human backgrounds.
Beyond rules, again, lie effects: beyond decisions stand people whom rules
and decisions directly or indirectly touch. The field of Law reaches both
forward and back from the Substantive Law of school and doctrine. The
sphere of interest is widening; so, too, is the scope of doubt. Beyond rules lie
effects-but do they? Are some rules mere paper? And if effects, what
effects? Hearsay, unbuttressed guess, assumption or assertion unchecked
by test-can such be trusted on this matter of what law is doing?
Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARv. L. REV. 1222, 1222 (1931) (emphasis omitted). As noted by others, Llewellyn
and Gilmore as fathers of the Uniform Commercial Code embraced the notion that
what happens in ordinary transactions should resonate with the law. See, e.g.,
Margit Livingston, Certainty, Efficiency, and Realism: Rights in Collateral Under
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 73 N.C. L. REV. 115, 180-82 (1994)
(comparing Llewellyn's style of open-ended drafting, giving parties freedom under
Article 2 to craft their sales, with Gilmore's closed-off approach in Article 9, leaving
courts no room for tinkering); Ellen A. Peters, In Memoriam, Grant Gilmore and the
Illusion of Certainty, 92 YALE L.J. 8, 9 (1982) ("Grant Gilmore's commitment to the
idea that certainty is illusory was not merely a commitment of theory. His writings
in commercial law reveal of course a searching mind probing always for flexible
solutions to problems perceived to be doctrinally intractable."); Zipporah Batshaw
Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 465, 466 (1987) (describing Karl Llewellyn's influence on Article 2 of the
UCC, if not in substance, certainly in spirit).
47 Under the unsecured aggregate creditor theory, consumers en masse give to
Starbucks, in the form of prepaid or deferred sales, a substantial unsecured loan-a
loan each fiscal year since 2006 amounting to between $76 million and $116 million
in unclaimed redemptions. Likewise, in the overall gift card market, consumers in
2008 purchased more than $65 billion in gift cards, ten percent of which went
unclaimed. Erica Alini, Governments Grab Unused Gift Cards, WALL ST. J., June 30,
2009, at A3.
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I. A DESCRIPTIVE NARRATIVE OF CONSUMER SVPS AND
CONSUMPTION GENTRIFICATION
On a city block, across the street from one another, sit two
storefronts-Starbucks Coffee and Cricket Wireless. Starbucks,
with its soft green and white logo recognized on cups of travelers
across the world, projects the calming allure of comfortable
chairs, hot mocha lattes, and soft sounds. Selling what many
term overpriced coffee, 4s Starbucks has become a symbol of
American prosperity as Americans' go-to for coffee or other
coffee-based treats.49 To be sure, Americans of all varieties find
Starbucks as common ground to engage in conversation, coffee,
and cultural encounters.50 It may not be too exaggerated to say
that as Starbucks goes, so goes the American economy. 5'
4 See Neil Munro, The Diversity Economy, NAT'L J. (July 24, 2010),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-diversity-economy-20100724 ("But
many professional-class Americans prefer Starbucks's offerings-such as a $4.25
venti skim spice pumpkin latte-in large part because they are served by a nose-
ringed barista in a tastefully decorated salon frequented by their university-
educated peers.").
49 Starbucks has had an undeniable impact on the American coffeehouse. "In
1990, there were approximately 200 freestanding coffee houses in the United States;
today there are over 14,000, with Starbucks owning about 30% of the total." Craig J.
Thompson & Zeynep Arsel, The Starbucks Brandscape and Consumers'
(Anticorporate) Experiences of Glocalization, 31 J. CONSUMER RES. 631, 631 (2004).
The coffeehouse in American culture has become the not-so random place for
Americans seeking casual conversation. As suggested by Rudolph Gaudio:
As a "native" participant in coffeehouse conversations, I can attest that
they often do feel quite ordinary, yet my experiences in a number of
cultural settings remind me that the ways in which I and other Americans
organize our schedules to combine casual conversation with the
consumption of food and drink in a commercial retail space are by no
means natural or universal.
Rudolf P. Gaudio, Coffeetalk: StarbucksTM and the Commercialization of Casual
Conversation, 32 LANGUAGE SOC'Y 659, 660 (2003).
50 Some have argued that the coffeehouse itself is the incubator-nay,
percolator-of diverse social interactions. See, e.g., MARKMAN ELLIS, THE
COFFEEHOUSE: A CULTURAL HISTORY (2004). As noted by Benjamin Alan Wufgaft:
Coffeehouses, as cultural historians and philosophers have been saying
ever since Jirgen Habermas's The Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere, were crucial testing grounds for the kind of public speech upon
which liberal democracies thrive. As the argument often runs, coffeehouses
presented patrons with what Habermas called an ideal speech situation, in
which, forgetting one another's social station and rank, people from all
classes and professions debated the issues of the day in rational terms.
Benjamin Aldes Wurgaft, 7 GASTRONOMICA: J. FOOD & CULTURE 111, 112 (2007)
(reviewing MARKMAN ELLIS, THE COFFEEHOUSE: A CULTURAL HISTORY (2004)). This
description is in direct contrast with two other prominent descriptions of
participants within the coffeehouse. Compare Thompson & Arsel, supra note 49, at
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The other store, with its own green and white display,
attracts a different type of customer. This customer is usually on
a budget. He seeks a service-a mobile phone-that has become
ubiquitous in modern social life.52 Cricket Wireless is attractive
to this customer base because it offers no contracts, low-cost
service, and no credit checks for customers having poor credit
ratings, which, if required, may be a deal-breaker. 53
It is not uncommon to see these two stores in close proximity
to one another. Starbucks has been associated with community
gentrification, as a forbearing symbol of the community's
transition from poor and depressed to thriving and vibrant.5 4 As
one writer said:
Starbucks coffee shops work in... intersecting spatial
tendencies. Indeed, few places work harder to at once contain
and exploit the cultural strains of fragmentation than
Starbucks. Individual Starbucks stores provide the rhetorical
634 (coffehouse as the urban flaneur), with Gaudio, supra note 49 (coffeehouse as
cultural space).
51 Building a Better Bank Card: Reaching the Unbanked with Stored Value
Cards, supra note 6.
52 See Near Ubiquitous Cell Phone Ownership, PEW RES. CENTER (Mar. 2, 2011),
http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/near-ubiquitous-cell-phone-ownership /
(stating that nearly eighty-five percent of all adults own a cell phone, making it the
most popular technological device in America "by far").
11 Prominently displayed on Cricket Wireless's website is a banner for no
contract and no activation fees. See MY CRICKET, http://www.mycricket.com (last
visited Sept. 25, 2014). Explaining Cricket Wireless's target audience, Vice President
of Muve Music, a service provided by Cricket Wireless, noted, "Cricket's customer is
young, is ethnic, and tends to be middle and lower income." See Ben Sisario, A
Digital Music Option Thrives, Though Quietly, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2012, at B3.
"4 See, e.g., Greg Dickinson, Joe's Rhetoric Finding Authenticity at Starbucks, 32
RHETORIC SOC'Y Q. 5, 6-7 (2002) ("[Starbucks] has become a cultural institution that
filters through a range of other popular discourses including journalism, film,
television, and novels. What is crucial about Starbucks, though, is the ways it is at
once a globalized consumer institution and a local place in which the mundane daily
activities of sipping coffee, writing in journals, and conversing with friends are
practiced."); Corey Kilgannon, Frothing over a Starbucks in Little Colombia, N.Y.
TIMES CITY ROOM BLOG (Apr. 3, 2008, 9:35 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.ny
times.com/2008/04103/frothing-over-a-starbucks-in-little-colombia/?_r=O (noting that
Starbucks often signals gentrification of neighborhoods where urban persons eager
to engage in cultural diversity also seek coffeehouse refuges: "Did the arrival of the
corporate chain signal the blandification of another special city neighborhood, one
whose exotic feel came from for its Babel of languages, turbaned residents and
streets lined with mom-and-pop stores selling Santeria supplies and saris;
immigration services and Bollywood videos; nightclubs offering dances with women
for $2 apiece"). See generally Gaudio, supra note 49; Thompson & Arsel, supra note
49.
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resources for creating coherency in the context of the seeming
cultural chaos that is constitutive of postmodernity. At the
same time, Starbucks, as a globalized consumer institution
whose green logo seems to be colonizing coffee across the world,
serves as a very visible and constitutive element of the context
to which it responds. As such, Starbucks embodies the kinds of
contradictions individuals themselves face. Starbucks, then, in
its proffering of coherent authenticity and as a globalized,
stylized and aestheticized consumer institution serves as a
powerful cultural node that brings together apparently
contradictory cultural forces.
55
Just as Starbucks targets customers that are likely to
emerge in the newly gentrified neighborhoods, Cricket Wireless
tends to target those persons who will likely be on their way out
of the neighborhood due to increased pricing.56 As Cricket
Wireless explains in its investor's annual report: "The
foundation of our business is to provide unlimited, nationwide
wireless services, and we design and market our products and
services to appeal to customers seeking increased value. None of
our services require customers to enter into long-term
commitments or pass a credit check."5"
Besides finding themselves near one another on a given city
block, Starbucks and Cricket Wireless have other things in
common-they use consumer stored value to promote their own
business and enable smart phones for mobile money transactions
using stored consumer value. In short, both companies are
transforming the ways Americans think about money and access
to money."8 And both are symbolic of a growing consumption
'5 Dickinson, supra note 54, at 10.
16 Paul Kapustka, Why Prepaid Wireless Plans Are on the Rise, PC WORLD, Jan.
2011, at 21-22 (noting that though "[olnce associated with boring, limited phones
aimed at relatively low-income users," prepaid phones are on the rise due to the
economic downfall and the ability to acquire better phones at a cheaper price);
Gautam Naik, Prepaid Plans Open up Cellular-Phone Market, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16,
1998, at B1; Elliot Spagat, Cellphone Carriers Use "Prepay" Plans as a Draw to
Lower-Income Customers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2001, at B10.
17 Leap Wireless International Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Oct. 28, 2013).
Anecdotally, when I first considered including Cricket Wireless in this Article, a
local math teacher described going to the Cricket Wireless store and paying $2.00 on
a student's parent's phone so that she could contact that parent about the student's
school work. The school is located in an economically depressed area, and its
students generally come from low-income and primarily minority families.
I8 Calling payments transformative is not necessarily new-though the
tendency of American scholars, lawyers, and judges has been to find room for new
payment technologies in existing paradigms. Nevertheless, new payments often
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gentrification, where products once targeting certain economic
classes are as likely found in the hands of the other as in the
targeted group.
A. Starbucks and the Starbucks Card
In 2001, Starbucks launched its Starbucks card, a gift card
for consumers to pass on to friends, family, and other
acquaintances. 59 Early on, the Starbucks card was a stored value
card, which could be reloaded by consumers. At that time, using
the card provided no additional benefits to customers.
Beginning in 2008, Starbucks unveiled its Starbucks Card
Rewards Program.6" The rewards program offered customers
transform the way we think about how the law interacts with commerce. See James
F. Bauerle, Headnote: Au Revoir Nextcard, Bonjour PayPal, 119 BANKING L.J. 499,
500 (2002) (noting that new technology success depends less on their ability to invent
new "paradigm[s] than on their ability to recognize and manage new manifestations
of age-old risks in a rapidly changing business"). For example, PayPal's emergence
challenged legislatures to consider whether PayPal should be considered as
performing bank-like functions or is a new form of e-commerce. See id. Analysts
considering money storage often deal on the cusps of categorizing the new payments
as either one of bank-like functions or contractual obligation. Compare Akindemowo,
supra note 9, at 278 (arguing that SVPs should be treated as "technology-enabled
contractual constructs rather than deposits"), with General Counsel's Opinion No. 8;
Stored Value Cards, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,490, 40,494 (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. Aug. 2,
1996), Definition of "Deposit"; Stored Value Cards, 69 Fed. Reg. 20,558, 20,563 (Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. Apr. 16, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 303), Electronic
Fund Transfers, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696, 19,698 (Fed. Reserve Sys. May 2, 1996) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 205), Electronic Fund Transfers, 69 Fed. Reg. 55,996, 55,997
(Fed. Reserve Sys. Sept. 17, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 205), and Electronic
Fund Transfers, 71 Fed. Reg. 51,437, 51,438 (Fed. Reserve Sys. Aug. 30, 2006) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 205). See also Olujoke E. Akindemowo, Electronic Money
Regulation: A Comparative Survey of Policy Influences in Australia, the European
Union and the United States of America, 11 J.L. & INFO. SCI. 61, 61-62 (2000); The
Task Force on Stored-Value Cards, A Commercial Lawyer's Take on the Electronic
Purse: An Analysis on Commercial Law Issues Associated with Stored-Value Cards
and Electronic Money, 52 Bus. LAw. 653, 654 (1997).
'9 The first Starbucks card was unveiled at the annual Starbucks employee
conference in February 2001. BUCKSCARDS.COM, http'J/buckscards.com/history.htm
(last visited Sept. 25, 2014). Shortly thereafter, Starbucks began rolling out cards in
test markets: first in the Seattle, Washington area, then Boise, Idaho; Vancouver;
Washington; and selected stores in Oregon. Id. The first transaction using a
Starbucks card occurred on April 20, 2001, while stores in Boise, Idaho; Vancouver;
Washington; and Oregon began accepting cards in June and July of 2001. Id.
Starbucks issued a nationwide rollout of the cards on November 14, 2001, to coincide
with the holiday season. Id.
o See Howard Schultz Transformation Agenda Communication #1, STARBUCKS
(Jan. 6, 2008), http'J/web.archive.org/web/20131106233052/http://news.star
bucks.com/news/howard-schultz-transformation-agenda-communication- 1; Howard
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who used their Starbucks card to pay for purchases additional
perks, such as free in-store wireless internet, free add-ons to
drinks, and free refills on hot and iced coffees.61 Beginning in
November 2008, Starbucks extended its rewards program to
allow consumers to purchase "gold card" status for twenty-five
dollars, entitling them to ten percent off purchases in stores, a
complimentary beverage on the holder's birthday, and free Wi-Fi
access two hours daily.62 The gold card's other important feature
was allowing cardholders to reload and auto-reload via the
Starbucks member website.63 In December 2009, Starbucks
consolidated its Starbucks Rewards and its Starbucks Gold
Rewards Programs into a single rewards program. 64 After
restructuring, gold membership became activated upon using the
Starbucks card thirty times in a calendar year.65
Also in 2009, Starbucks began beta testing its Starbucks
card mobile app. Initially launched for the iPhone, the app was
designed to allow consumers to check their balances and
Schultz Transformation Agenda Communication #3, STARBUcKS (Jan. 30, 2008),
http:l/news.starbucks.com/news/howard-schultz-transformation-agenda-communi
cation-3 (on file with author); Starbucks Takes Next Step in Putting Money Back in
Loyal Customers' Wallets, STARBUCKS (Nov. 11, 2008), http://news.starbucks.com/
news/starbucks-takes-next-step-in-putting-money-back-in-loyal-customers-wallets
(on file with author).
61 Starbucks Takes Next Step in Putting Money Back in Loyal Customers'
Wallets, supra note 60.
62 Id. Starbucks CEO, Howard Schultz, said:
We are also receiving recognition for listening to our customers during
these tough economic times. Based on the responses received from over 1
million newly registered Starbucks card holders since we launched the
program in April, we will enhance and take our Starbucks Card Rewards
program to the next level of increased value in the fall. This will continue
to demonstrate our sensitivity to current economic conditions, as well as
further our attachment with our customers.
Starbucks Continues To Implement Transformation Plan, Announces Organizational
Changes To Support Long-Term Growth, STARBUcKS (July 29, 2008),
http://investor.starbucks.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=99518&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1180
761&highlight=.
6 Sometime in 2009, Starbucks began sending to "Gold" customers-who were
the most loyal-a Starbucks "Gold Black" card, which opened a more extensive array
of benefits.
64 Starbucks Consolidates Card Programs for Easier, More Rewarding Loyalty
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conveniently reload their Starbucks cards from their iPhone 6 At
the same time, Starbucks began beta testing its payment app in
stores in Seattle, Washington and Northern California. Early
in 2010, Starbucks continued the beta test of the mobile
payments system in two distinct markets-Target store-based
Starbucks locations in March 2010 and New York City Starbucks
locations in October 2010.68 Then, on January 19, 2011,
Starbucks announced a national rollout of mobile payments in all
U.S. stores.69
Since their unveiling, the Starbucks card and the mobile app
have been an overwhelming success. In 2010, Starbucks
reported that Starbucks card sales and reloads topped $1.5
billion. Activations and reloads increase by almost $1 billion in
2011, reaching $2.4 billion.70 Activations are the original sale of
a Starbucks card to a consumer, while reloads represent dollars
consumers spend putting money back on a card already
activated. The rise of the Starbucks card and mobile app can be
traced to specific innovations Starbucks offered as a part of its
rewards program. Those efforts have certainly solidified the
Starbucks returning customer base, if not improved its ability to
attract new customers.
For example, in 2009 Starbucks experienced an economic
downturn, requiring new measures to drive up profitability.
Certainly, the newly revamped Starbucks card program was a
part of Starbucks' efforts to drive consumers back to the coffee
house despite having fewer dollars in their wallets.71 Looking
across its financial data, between 2006 and 2012, Starbucks saw
the financial value of activations drop in only two years-2009
6 Fact Sheet: Starbucks Card Mobile App & Mobile Payment, STARBUCKS (Jan.
23, 2011), http://news.starbucks.com/news/fact-sheet-starbucks-card-mobile-app-
mobile-payment.
67 Starbucks Expands Mobile Payment Test to New York City and Long Island,
STARBUCKS (Oct.. 25, 2010), http://news.starbucks.com/news/starbucks-expands-
mobile-payment-test-to-new-york-city-and-long-island.
6 Id.; Starbucks Expands Payment Capability of Its Starbucks Card Mobile App
to More than 1,000 Target Stores Nationwide, STARBUCKS (Mar. 31, 2010),
http://web.archive.org/web/20131031073015/http://news.starbucks.com/news/starbuc
ks-expands-payment-capability-of-its-starbucks-card-mobile-app-to-mo.
69 Mobile Payment Debuts Nationally at Starbucks, STARBUCKS (Jan. 19, 2011),
http://news.starbucks.com/news/mobile-payment-debuts-nationally-at-starbucks.
70 See Chloe Albanesius, Starbucks Unveils Mobile Payment System for
BlackBerry, iOS, PC MAG (Jan. 19, 2011, 9:38 AM), http://www.pcmag.com/
article2/0,2817,2375960,00.asp.
71 See Mobile Payment Debuts Nationally at Starbucks, supra note 69.
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and 2010. However, during that same period, Starbucks reloads
increased 29.52% in 2009 and 49.60% in 2010. In fact, since
2006, Starbucks has increased its amount of reloads sales every
year and improved every quarter from the previous year's
quarter every year.72
Likewise, the Starbucks mobile card app has certainly not
detracted from the mobile card's allure. The card's simplicity
may be partially the reason. The Starbucks mobile card payment
application offered consumers with iPhones, Blackberries, and
Android-based smart phones the option of paying for their
products by using their mobile smart phone. Unlike other mobile
payment technologies, which utilize multimedia messaging
services-commonly referred to as texting-to transfer funds or
Near Field Communication,7" the Starbucks app displays a
barcode, which can be scanned by a Starbucks barista to debit
the balance that has been loaded on the mobile app.74 The virtue
of this approach is that the consumer feels like there is more
control over their payments than merely communicating via
wireless technology. Likewise, the ease of access on a mobile
phone, in which the payment means is located immediately at
hand, allows consumers to check balances and, if necessary,
reload using a pre-stored credit or debit card.75 Thus, Starbucks
has managed to bring near cash-like qualities to a stored value
card-instant notification of the ability to make a purchase
together with the capacity to do so. 7 6
72 Id.
73 See Mobile Payments: An Evolving Landscape, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/siwinl2/mobile.ht
ml (last updated Jan. 3, 2013).
74 The Starbucks mobile payment app works via a platform supported by the
Starbucks card. Consumers purchase the cards in Starbucks locations through credit
card, debit card, or cash transactions. Once purchased, consumers then may
"associate" the card with the mobile card app on their smart phone.
75 Consumers may also go online and purchase virtual Starbucks cards, which
can then be associated with the mobile phone app. See Get the Starbucks App for
iPhone and Android, STARBUCKS, http://www.starbucks.com/coffeehousemobile-
apps (last visited Sept. 25, 2014). Consumers may also set the app to automatically
reload their Starbucks card through their credit card or debit card. Id.
76 Consumers may check balances immediately prior to using the card via the
mobile app. Consumers pay with the app by pressing an icon that reads "touch to
pay," which then reveals a barcode, which the barista then scans to debit the card




Even in the face of potential security risks, consumers
continue to use the Starbucks mobile app. In mid-July 2011,
software developer Jonathan Stark launched the ambitious social
project called Jonathan's Card.7 Stark purchased a Starbucks
card, registered that card, and then distributed the image of that
card to the world by taking a picture of the bar code. 78  He
publicized the card through his website: www.jonathanstark.com,
through Facebook,7 9 and also through a Twitter account 8° tied to
the title "Jonathan's Card."8 ' Those pages encouraged users to
download the image of the card, take a free coffee, and then
upload more money so that other users could do the same-the
"take a penny, leave a penny tray" ethic found at convenience
stores, only applied to cups of coffee instead; consumers were also
encouraged to report back on how they used the card and other
instances of community sharing.82  Over the four weeks-from
July 20, 2011 to August 12, 2011-Jonathan's Card received
substantial activity.83 According to the statistics reported at the
17 See generally Jonathan's Card, JONATHANSTARK, http:l/jonathanstark.com/
card/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2014). See also Doug Gross, Want a Cup of Coffee? Use
Jonathan's Card, CNN (Aug. 8, 2011, 4:07 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/TECH/
mobile/08/08/jonathans.card.starbucks/index.html. The dates for the statistics for
Jonathan's Card use begin as a "mindate: 2011-07-20." See Aggregate Numbers
Report, http://jonathanstark.com/card/api/summary (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
78 See Jonathan's Card, supra note 77. The mobile apple card works by placing
an image of a bar code on a user's mobile device, which is scanned at the register. As
Part II discusses, this way of accessing stored money is unique when paired with a
mobile device. Starbucks has employed the barcode-based system instead of near-
field communication technology because of the current scarcity of near-field payment
options. See Matt Hamblen, Starbucks Mobile Payments Perk Past 26M
Transactions, COMPUTERWORLD (Dec. 7, 2011, 2:52 PM), http://www.computer
world.com/s/article/9222481/Starbucksmobile-pay-ments-perkpast_26Mtrans
actions_.
79 See Jonathan's Card, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/jonathanscard
(last visited Sept. 25, 2014).
80 See Jonathan's Card, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/#!/jonathanscard (last
visited Sept. 25, 2014).
81 Jonathan's Card, FACEBOOK, supra note 79; Jonathan's Card, TWITTER, supra
note 80. For an image of the card, see Image of Jonathan's Card, JONATHAN STARK,
http'//jonathanstark.com/images/sbux-card.png (last visited Sept. 25, 2014).
82 See Jonathan's Card, supra note 77 ("Jonathan's Card is an experiment in
social sharing of physical goods using digital currency on mobile phones.... Based
on the similarity to the 'take a penny, leave a penny' trays at convenience stores in
the US, I've adopted a similar 'get a coffee, give a coffee' terminology for Jonathan's
Card.").
" Jonathan's Card was terminated, it appears, on August 12, 2011. The entry




Jonathan Stark website, the card added $13,025.99 in 917
transactions. The card was used 1,332 times.84 The experiment
worked largely because the platform for using the Starbucks card
was so simplified-an image of a barcode-that it was easily
replicated.
On August 12, 2011, Starbucks terminated the card.85
Another software developer, Sam Odio, had designs of a social
experiment of his own. Sam Odio wrote a script that allowed
users to transfer funds donated on Jonathan's Card to a card of
their own.86 As Odio wrote in his own blog, "I've personally
netted $625 by spending less than 5 hours at Starbucks. That's
enough for an iPad."87 Sam then explained his intentions:
I'm not getting an iPad, though. Instead I'm selling the card on
eBay and donating the proceeds to Save the Children.
Assuming the card sells for face value I'll have fed 20 children
for a month. So here's your social experiment: will people bid
up the price of the card to face value (or possibly exceed it)? Or
am I alone in thinking that helping a stranger find their next
caffeine fix is not what we should be worried about in today's
world?"8
These two social experiments revealed an important
externality for consumers using the Starbucks mobile payment
system-that user accounts were not secured in the same way
that other financial accounts are secured.8 9 To hack a user's
mobile card, a wrongdoer only had to take a screen shot of the
victim's mobile app barcode.90 The fact that a barcode could be
Id. Stark also reported that for every two people who downloaded the image of
his card to drain the account, one more person added money back to the account. See
Daniel Wolfe, Starbucks Nips 'Social' Prepaid Card, AM. BANKER, Aug. 17, 2011. In
another report, Stark's card reportedly attracted more than 500 users who spent
more than $8,000 through the card. See Alex Goldmark, Lessons from the End of the
Free Starbucks Card Experiment (UPDATED) Jonathan's Card Starbucks Sharing
Experiment Shut Down, GOOD (Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.good.is/postl
lessons-from-the-end-of-the-free-for-all-starbucks-card-experiment/.
8 Wolfe, supra note 84.
86 Id.
"' How To Use Jonathan's Card To Buy Yourself an iPad, SAM ODIO (Aug. 12,
2011), http://sam.odio.com/2011/08/12/i-took-625-jonathans-card/.
88 Id.
I" For example, one website detailed the distinction between Starbucks mobile
payment app and other mobile payment services. See Shane McGlaun, Stabucks [sic]
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replicated and used on multiple devices by multiple users who
are not necessarily authenticated users to that account raised the
technical security problem of access. When questioned about this
purported security problem, Starbucks responded by pointing out
the limits that the point of access conveyed. Starbucks said that
other Starbucks Card users should not be concerned, because the
app did not convey any financial information about the person
uploading a balance. Starbucks offered reassurance to customers
by stating that Starbucks offered balance protection for
registered customers.91
Starbucks also affirmed the basic proposition that the
Starbucks card replicated cash-like spending and therefore
required cash-like controls. It advised consumers that a
Starbucks card could only be synced to one mobile device at a
time. It also told consumers that while the balance of an account
was protected, it was only protected from the time that Starbucks
was made aware of the intrusion. Put simply, Starbucks would
not replenish cash spent by a wrongdoer if the customer did not
put Starbucks on notice that the card was out of the customer's
control.
B. Cricket Wireless and Prepaid Cellular
In 1999, Leap Wireless began offering unlimited prepaid
mobile service under the brand name Cricket Wireless. Prepaid
service was not new-since 1993, various carriers had offered
customers low-cost, no-commitment mobile options. These
options were generally seen as inferior to their post-paid
counterparts-either because they offered fewer service
connections, cheaper devices, or were available in fewer markets.
Cricket Wireless, though, expanded the prepaid market by being
the first company to offer unlimited services.
Over the past ten years, Cricket Wireless has bolstered its
brand in a number of ways. First, Cricket Wireless has
significantly expanded its market presence, going "nationwide"
with its services. Second, Cricket Wireless offers two types of
91 Starbucks Card Terms and Conditions, STARBUCKS, http://starbucks.com
card/card-terms-and-conditions (last visited Sept. 25, 2014). The Starbucks Terms
and Conditions note that the balance protection was that customers can report lost
or stolen cards and Starbucks will freeze the remaining balance at the time it is




prepaid wireless services. The first option, the traditional
prepaid service, allows consumers to pay one month in advance.
These plans offer higher-end phones at a higher monthly cost. If
a consumer fails to reload their phone within sixty days of their
last reload, the account is considered to have "churned" or
terminated. The second option is what Cricket Wireless terms
"Paygo" plans.92 These plans offer either monthly terms or daily
terms, allowing consumers to recharge a phone for as little as
$1.50 per day. Consumers that allow their plans to lapse past
the sixty-day period must pay a thirty-five dollar reactivation fee
plus the pre-paid minutes to reactivate the service.
Cricket Wireless's expansion into the prepaid market has
been one that focuses on traditionally unstable communities-
youth and poverty-based clientele. Both the price point of
Cricket Wireless's services and the services Cricket Wireless
offers suggest that Cricket Wireless's financial gains come from
intermittent users rather than consistent long-term customers.
This focus has several effects. For example, Cricket Wireless
offers an unlimited music service designed to attract users to
their smart phones.98 Thus, consumers may actually pay more
for a Cricket Wireless smart phone device, while paying nearly
the same or less for its monthly service fee. What users perceive
is that the added value of the service-a service which likely is
attractive to the limited demographics that Cricket Wireless
targets-plus the flexibility of not having a contract makes
Cricket Wireless more enticing. Of course, some consumers may
actually be forced to use Cricket Wireless because a poor credit
rating may foreclose other mobile options.
One question that is unclear is how Cricket Wireless's
traditional means of allocating risk amongst its unstable
customer base will allow it to further broaden 'its operations. For
example, Cricket Wireless is in the process of unveiling its mobile
wallet, a feature that will allow users to store money, make
purchases, pay bills, and deposit checks from their Cricket
Wireless smart phone. With the prepaid mobility model, several
92 As a part of writing this Article, I visited several Cricket Wireless stores to
find out what terms might be available. One clerk told me that Cricket Wireless was
in the process of phasing out the Paygo plans since they were not as profitable to the
company.
9' Cricket Wireless's music service "Muve" was designed to target audiences who
do not have regular access to a computer and who earn less than $35,000 per year.
See Sisario, supra note 53.
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questions perk up relating to the Cricket Wireless mobile wallet:
Is the money stored in the Cricket Wireless mobile wallet
accessible outside the mobile wallet? If not, how should we view
the fee to reactivate a Cricket Wireless mobile phone service-
and therefore the mobile wallet?
More so, Cricket Wireless has also found inroads into the
premium cellular market by adopting high-end telephones, such
as the iPhone, Blackberry Curve, and other models generally
reserved for contract service users. Like Starbucks, whose
product is marketed to certain customers of particular income,
Cricket Wireless is showing that it too can compete across
economic sectors, while still fostering its target audience.
C. A Theory of Consumption Gentrification, the Unsecured
Aggregate Creditor, and the Politics of Regulation
This Article makes the argument that consumption
gentrification is a factor to be considered as we evaluate remedies
for consumers of SVPs. I define consumption gentrification as
the infiltration of market economies by those outside of those
economies, without adequate protection for the most vulnerable
of participants. Gentrification in geographical terms is the
infiltration of lower-income housing by middle class and
professional class persons, whose presence and repair then raises
the value of the property beyond the reach of the original
inhabitants.94 At the core is escalation of a price market for
which existing residents were not prepared. Gentrification as a
general idea raises issues of access and social mobility relating to
the occupation of space.96
94 Gentrification in its conventional sense relates to the infiltration of working-
class neighborhoods by middle-class homebuyers, which then drives the price of
property beyond the reach of prior residents. See George C. Galster, Gentrification as
Diversification: Why Detroit Needs It and How It Can Get It, 4 J.L. Soc'Y 29, 29
(2002) ("'Gentrification' is often used as a pejorative term. In many circles,
gentrificationj connotes unscrupulous developers forcing the poor and elderly from
their long-time homes so that the vacated premises can be turned over to in-moving
higher-income households, presumably at sumptuous profits."); Neil Smith,
Gentrification and Uneven Development, 58 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 139, 139 n.1 (1982).
9' Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation,
Concentrated Affluence, and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 1, 31-32 (2006) (noting that despite price increases, many lower-income residents
choose to devote more resources to housing, rather than leave their community).
9 Gentrification could serve as a powerful metaphor for understanding how
collective responsibilities impact individual entitlements. Metaphor, could then
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Starbucks's and Cricket Wireless's development of SVPs to
further their businesses prompts some distinctive questions
about consumer access to funds stored with these businesses and
the role that payment mechanisms play in advancing social
mobility. To be sure, these two themes share common traits,
though they also are distinctive social goals that should be
considered.
One question that consumption gentrification raises is that
of access to the implied terms of the transaction. Moreover, there
is good reason, as Bob Cooter and Ed Rubin have suggested,
entities like Starbucks and Cricket Wireless have spent more
time and effort formulating terms and conditions that greatly
benefit their own interests, while consumers have likely spent
little time evaluating their own interests in light of those terms.
7
This benefit may be particularly problematic as consumers
maintain different levels of sophistication in understanding the
impacts of their transaction. For example, one issue that may
not be clear to all consumers is the way that Starbucks
concurrently maintains multiple roles in the transaction. More
problematic is where consumers may assume that the
transaction's similarity to other things gives rise to certain
rights-that a deposit may not be a deposit, and a sale may not
be a sale.
For example, Starbucks's terms and conditions make clear
that Starbucks does not provide, nor does it want to be perceived
as providing, banking services, probably with good reason."
serve as a powerful vehicle for understanding shared responsibilities and collective
responses to social problems. One such use of gentrification as metaphor has asked
how "people [can] be heard and understood on their own terms." See Metaphors and
Questions in Harlem, 58 J. ARCHITECTURAL EDUC. 59, 59 (2004) (reviewing
HARLEMWORLD: METROPOLIS AS METAPHOR (Thelma Golden ed., 2003)).
" Cooter & Rubin, supra note 20, at 68-69 (noting the costs of asymmetrical
information on consumers).
9' See Starbucks Card Terms & Conditions, STARBUCKS, https://www.star
bucks.com/card/card-terms-and-conditions (last visited Sept. 25, 2014). Terms and
conditions that indicate a distance from banking include the following: (1) "Unless
otherwise required by law or permitted by this agreement, any amount on your
Starbucks Card is nonrefundable and may not be redeemed for cash"; (2) "No
interest, dividends or any other earnings on funds deposited to a Starbucks Card
will accrue or be paid or credited to you by Starbucks"; (3) "The value associated
with the Starbucks Card is not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC)"; "We shall have no liability for any billing error unless you
provide us notice within 60 days of the date of the transaction in question. You
should monitor your transactions and account balances closely"; (4) "Because your
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Banks owe significant duties to their customers-including
fiduciary duties-that create significant costs on banks to carry
out.9 9 Banks also owe reporting duties to the state agencies
commissioned with governing banking activities and federal
agencies, namely the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation °°
and the Securities and Exchange Commission if the bank is a
publicly traded company or engages in securitizing.' °'
The Starbucks SVP fits into a broader context of non-
banking firms offering money storage as a means to building
customer loyalty. 10 2  This money storage is distinctive from
Starbucks Card is used like cash for purchases from Starbucks,... you are
responsible for all transactions associated with your Starbucks Card, including
unauthorized transactions. However, if your Starbucks Card is lost, stolen or
destroyed, the Card can be replaced with the balance remaining on it at the time of
your call, but only if you have registered it with us"; and (5) "Your Starbucks Card
balance is only protected from the point in time you notify us that your Starbucks
Card is missing. We will freeze the remaining balance on your Starbucks Card at the
time you notify us and will load that remaining balance on a replacement Starbucks
Card." Id.
9 See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q)-(r) (2012); see also Heidi Mandanis Schooner,
Fiduciary Duties' Demanding Cousin: Bank Director Liability for Unsafe or Unsound
Banking Practices, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175, 180-81 (1995).
oo The FDIC requires depository institutions, which include banks and even
private individuals engaged in securitizing, to insure deposits. MICHAEL P. MALLOY,
PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION 36 (3d ed. 2011). The regulations were adopted in
an effort to ward off a domino effect of bank failure, like the 1920s pandemonium
that shook American's confidence in the banking system. Stephen K. Huber,
Mandatory Information Disclosure About Banks, 6 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 53, 56
(1987). The current model of the Glass-Steagall Act opens the door, however, for
"bank holding companies" to engage in financial activities that are "incident" or
"closely related" to actual banking activities absent any regulation. See
12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8). Unless the non-banking, yet admittedly financial, activity
"poses a systemic risk to the financial system," it is free of SEC constraints under
the Glass-Steagall Act. K. Sabeel Rahman, Note, Envisioning the Regulatory State:
Technocracy, Democracy, and Institutional Experimentation in the 2010 Financial
Reform and Oil Spill Statutes, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 555, 563 (2011). Banks
commonly use third parties to implement banking services; in turn, payments
processing as well as development and maintenance of stored value systems now fall
under the incidental non-banking category, free of Glass-Steagall Act constraints.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1843.
101 Banks, which are also publicly traded companies, and those that issue
securities are regulated by Securities and Exchange Commission provisions,
mandating they report financial statements periodically, so that the financial
soundness of the entity is transparent to investors. Cynthia A. Williams, The
Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112
HARv. L. REV. 1197, 1207 (1999).
'02 See MILLER & HUGHES, supra note 33 (reifying that closed systems remain a
type of stored value, though the legal description is as an agreement between the
issuer and the customer).
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transactions that merely function as a gateway to other
products-for example, if the scanning of the SVP resulted in
debiting a checking account or credit account in which it were
tied.1"3  Instead, Starbucks actually maintains balances for
customers, which are tied to their Starbucks card accounts.
1 0 4
Starbucks reports that in 2010, consumers loaded more than $1.5
billion on Starbucks cards.'0 5
This issue of money storage is not new in consumer
transactions. Indeed, the specter of money storage became an
issue with PayPal's success in the peer-to-peer payments
market. 106 One of the principal features of the PayPal account
has been the ability to maintain money for transfer in any
number of directions-to other PayPal account holders or to one's
own bank or credit account. 1 7 In the early part of last decade,
New York, Louisiana, Idaho, and California expressed concerns
that PayPal operated as an unauthorized banking business.'
Scholars too have questioned how PayPal's bank-like business
model can operate without the burden of regulatory oversight.
As one scholar said:
It would be unfair to directly compare [PayPal's] growth rate
and spread between interest income and expense to those of any
depository institution. Yet it cannot be denied that eBay and
103 The prohibition of banking firms from engaging in other forms of financial
commerce has a long history dating back to the market crashes of the 1930s. See
Peter J. Ferrara, The Regulatory Separation of Banking from Securities and
Commerce in the Modern Financial Marketplace, 33 ARiz. L. REV. 583, 583 (1991).
But, nonbanking firms can replicate banking functions without being a recognized
bank. See Budnitz, supra note 10, at 1068 (calling for regulation on non-banking
firms offering money storage).
104 See Starbucks Card Terms & Conditions, supra note 98 (describing funds
held as a "prepayment" for goods).
105 See Supplemental Financial Data, STARBUCKS (2014), http://investor.star
bucks.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=99518&p=irol-financialhighlights. Starbucks takes in a
jolting amount of money through its customer card; money on which it sits until
claimed-perhaps if claimed would be more precise. According to the company's
supplemental financial data, Starbucks has steadily influenced card-carrying
customer habits each year since 2006. Collectively, consumers trusted the coffee
corporation with more than $1 billion in 2007, and every year after, with newly
stored payments peaking at $2.1 billion in 2011. Id.
'" See Carl Kaminski, Note, Online Peer-to-Peer Payments: PayPal Primes the
Pump, Will Banks Follow?, 7 N.C. BANKING INST. 375,376 (2003).
107 See id.
108 See, e.g., Matt Richtel, Technology Briefing I Internet: Another Problem for
PayPal, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/12/business/
technology-briefing-internet-another-problem-for-paypal.html.
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PayPal enjoy the benefit of a business model built on the back of
the nation's financial system without being burdened with the
associated costs that financial institutions bear. For PayPal's
system to operate, its customers must have a bank account or
credit card account from which PayPal can withdraw funds
being sent and to which PayPal can remit funds received for a
customer's benefit. Yet the company pays no FDIC assessment,
is not subject to examination and associated fees, and has no
Community Reinvestment Act responsibilities. Best of all, the
funds that PayPal customers send to other customers are
removed from the senders' bank accounts (or charged to their
credit cards) when the senders initiate the transactions. The
funds remain available to PayPal for investment until the
intended recipients claim the funds. Thus, PayPal receives free
of charge the benefit of the banking industry's infrastructure,
while being permitted to compete directly with banks for the
use of funds in transit between payors and payees. 10 9
Just as the innovation of SVPs enhance access to certain
payment options, that access in turn enhances social mobility.11 °
For example, the Starbucks card and its mobile app fit within the
broader categories of payment mechanisms we call additive and
transformative. Additive models are those that provide an
alternative means of access for consumers to existing means of
payment. Transformative models are those that alter the
financial options available to consumers by creating new forms of
economic access. Because the Starbucks card both draws on
existing payment mechanisms and expands the way consumers
access those options, it falls into a payment technology that is
both doing something old, and something new.
As economists William Jack and Tavneet Suri have found,
the safe storage and transfer of funds facilitates a number of
economic benefits. As they say in their report on the economics
of other mobile money platforms in developing countries:
First, it simply facilitates trade, making it easier for people to
pay for, and to receive payment for, goods and services.
Electricity bills can be paid with a push of a few buttons instead
of traveling to an often distant office with a fistful of cash and
109 James F. Bauerle, Technology, Law, and Banking, 123 BANKING L.J. 751,
754-55(2006).
110 See William Jack & Tavneet Suri, Mobile Money: The Economics of M-Pesa




waiting in a long queue; consumers can quickly purchase cell
phone credit ("airtime") without moving; and taxi drivers can
operate more safely, without carrying large amounts of cash,
when they are paid electronically."'
Like developing countries, there is a correlation between
poverty rates and access to banking or credit accounts. Thus,
when Starbucks-or other companies-launch a program that
allows consumers to store cash value, while accessing credit-like
convenience, the practice is likely to enhance social mobility.
Indeed, the fact that these consumers have in hand such a
device, which allows them similar financial access as their bank
account or credit card, will have an impact on the way purchases
shape our social environment. At the same time, innovations
offering such a drastic reshaping of our social environment
should give us pause to question how such technologies should be
regulated.
This potential to reshape our social economy is buffered by
the imbalance that consumers stand in when considering not
only the disincentive merchants have for offering more balanced
terms, but also proceeds merchants collect in these transactions.
Considering the average consumer to Starbucks maintains a
balance of less than fifty dollars, Starbucks has little incentive to
negotiate more balanced terms. The consumer's recourse
towards a breaching merchant is a legal action where the costs
overwhelm the value of the transaction and where the gain is
"I See id. at 10. The extension of the Starbucks card to the mobile phone
demonstrates the way in which the transformative practices of Starbucks can lead to
consumption gentrification. Traditionally, when we describe mobile money
transactions, we refer to the type of mobile money innovations taking place in
developing countries. In its traditional role, mobile payments technology allows
users to use their mobile phones to pay for goods on the spot, either through
multimedia messaging services or through proprietary apps and readers developed
by merchants to accept these payments. The idea of mobile money was initiated as a
result of a focus on alleviating poverty by the United Nations millennium
development goals; the goals aim to reduce poverty by fifty percent by the year 2015.
To further that goal of reducing poverty, Vodafone sponsored by a fifty percent
match grant established by the U.K. Government's Financial Deepening Challenge
Fund, partnered with Safaricom-Kenya's largest mobile phone carrier-to provide
an alternative to banking in Kenya. The alternative to banking was necessary
because of the scarcity of banking relationships in Kenya. Studying the problem,
Safaricom noted that there were more people in Kenya that owned cell phones than
had banking accounts. Starting in 2007, M-Pesa's services began to fill that void by
extending normal banking services through cellular technology. By many accounts,
Safaricom's M-Pesa service has been the most successful mobile-financial service in
the developing world.
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likely absorbed by the litigation costs. Moreover, collective action
as a class action is even more precarious, as one breach to one
consumer may not be repeated on a systematic basis sufficient to
form a class. And the new Class Action Fairness Act may indeed
give pause to attorneys who would otherwise bring a class action
matter with any potential for dismissal.112
Importantly these views of the consumer are constrained by
our traditional view that remedies generally arise after injury. I
want to offer a different perspective. Perhaps the better way to
understand SVP consumers is as a single aggregate creditor,
with aligned interests and the sharing of mutual risk. Indeed,
from that perspective, Starbucks is not a debtor to many
creditors averaging an indebtedness of less than fifty dollars.
Instead, Starbucks is the debtor to a single aggregate of creditors
who have loaned it more than $1.5 billion a year with no security,
non-competitive terms, and little recourse for remedying any
breach. This Article suggests that consumers, as a single,
unsecured aggregate creditor, warrant greater consideration of
remedies by merchants.
II. SVPs IN THE SPECTER OF COMMERCIAL AND PAYMENT
POLICIES
Inquiring into what remedies SVPs should be subject to
forces us to consider various commercial law paradigms. First, it
represents a contract for a future sale of goods or services.11
Second, it constitutes a creditor-debtor relationship, where the
merchant is a debtor and the consumer a creditor.1 4 Third, it
represents a financial product where consumers store money for
112 See, e.g., Preira v. Bancorp Bank, 885 F. Supp. 2d 672, 675, 681-82 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (denying class certification under Class Action Fairness Act for gift card class).
113 See, e.g., Doerhoff v. Gen. Growth Props., Inc., No. 06-04099-CV-C-SOW,
2006 WL 3210502, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 6, 2006) ("When a customer purchases a
Gift Card, there is a written agreement supplied with the card setting forth the
terms and conditions for the Gift Card[] .... ").
114 See Green v. Charter One Bank, N.A., 640 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1004 (N.D. Ill.
2009) (rejecting claim that bank owed a fiduciary duty in favor of a debtor creditor
relationship); see also Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Sidamon-Eristoff,
755 F. Supp. 2d 556, 621 (D.N.J. 2010), affd, 669 F.3d 359 (3rd Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 345 (2012) (noting the creditor-debtor relationship by merchants
and purchasers of gift cards); In re BGI, Inc., 476 B.R. 812, 820 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y
2012) (determining whether gift card holders were "known creditors"). Nevertheless,
gift card holders are recognized as creditors for purposes of holding a bankruptcy
privilege. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (2012).
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later use. 115  Because SVPs are so intertwined with existing
commercial paradigms, a starting place for any solution should
consider how commercial law and payments law attempt to
incorporate fairness into its structures.
When we think of commercial law remedies, we generally
think of them as remedies against breach of the bargain between
the parties. The goods ordered and paid for were not of the kind,
variety, or number the parties agreed to;"' the date the debtor
was supposed to pay his promissory note passed without
payment; 117 or the debtor failed to adhere to a condition of the
security agreement, such as insuring the merchandise or
providing the creditor with sales figures for a specific quarter."'
It is quite easy for us to think that all remedies in commercial
dealings have at their core a contractual dispute between the
parties. One could make the case that contractual disputes are
largely about fairness and our constructed notions of justice.
I argue in this Part that the commercial law remedies-and
consumer law remedies-are more nuanced than that. Notions of
fairness that revolve around commercial law remedies are guided
by paradigms of notice, where parties should be alerted to the
remedies that are available to them. Those paradigms are time,
action, and risk. That is, at the outset of the transaction, parties
become aware of the various constraints they must adhere to so
that their remedy is effective. The time that the remedy is
contemplated allows the consumer-creditor to know what is at
stake before the transaction is complete; the action required to
facilitate the remedy affords the parties notice of the things they
should undertake, or need not undertake, to ensure that a
contemplated remedy is available; and the risk paradigm allows
115 See Mann v. TD Bank, N.A., No. 09-1062 (RBK/AMD), 2010 WL 4226526, at
*9 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2010) (describing gift cards as more closely resembling financial
bearer instruments).
116 See generally U.C.C. § 2-711; William H. Lawrence, Appropriate Standards
for a Buyer's Refusal To Keep Goods Tendered by a Seller, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1635, 1640-49 (1994) (summarizing the rationale for perfect tender rule as enhanced
certainty, economic efficiency, and promotion of quality standards).
117 See U.C.C. § 3-304.
118 U.C.C. § 9-601 states that a creditor's remedies arise after "default." Id. § 9-
601(a). The U.C.C. does not venture to define default, though cases have suggested
that default is either defined by the parties in their security agreement, or in the
absence of agreement, by the failure to pay the obligation when due. See, e.g.,
Whisenhunt v. Allen Parker Co., 168 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1969) (noting that the death of
a debtor may constitute a default).
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the parties to calculate whether the bargain is an efficient
transaction. More so, though, commercial law remedies largely
respond to party expectations.
Problematically, these paradigms are not always transparent
to all participants. One reason may be the perception by
merchants that commercial law dealings and remedies are
constrained by forces external to the concepts of fairness, and are
more responsive to things like legal formalities, such as the
passing of risk through strategic operations and the ability to
obtain knowledge before the transaction, no matter how onerous
obtaining that knowledge may be. Some consumers may not be
aware of various transactional remedy constraints, unlike their
commercial counterparts. Other consumers may be limited by
their ability to act on the remedy. Where the paradigms of time,
action, and risk operate against the consumer's understanding of
the transaction, we should consider whether alternative remedies
should be available.
Overlaying the question of fairness is the question of social
efficiency. Indeed, one primary purpose of payments systems is
to ensure an efficient exchange of payment mediums that
facilitate the exchange of goods and services. 1 9 That efficiency is
aided by structures that encourage liquidity, longevity, and trust
between merchant and consumer. 120 Importantly, because SVPs
are payment mechanisms, any remedy should further, not
detract from, these goals.
In the first subsection, I describe how paradigms of time,
action, and risk operate in traditional commercial law dealings to
resonate fair dealings that commercial contracts are presumed to
ensure. In the second subsection, I describe how the paradigms
of longevity, liquidity, and trust inure to create efficiency and
confidence in payment products.
19 See generally JAMES STEVEN ROGERS, THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW OF
BILLS AND NOTES: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL LAW
94-124 (1995) (providing a historical discussion of the process by which bills of
exchange came to be used as payment and credit devices rather than as devices for
transferring funds from one location to another). See also Mann, supra note 10, at
958 (noting how bills of exchange enhanced liquidity of instruments and also
enhanced their attractiveness in commerce).
" See, e.g., Mann, supra note 10, at 965.
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A. Paradigms of Time, Action, and Risk in Commercial
Contracting
Imagine a consumer purchases a Starbucks card worth
twenty-five dollars from Starbucks to give as a gift during the
holiday season. The purchaser of the card might care if the
recipient can use the card or if there are limitations on the use of
the card. The purchaser might also care if the recipient needs to
do something to fully realize the card's worth. Knowing these
things at the outset might influence the buyer's intent to
purchase the item. It might also alter how the purchaser conveys
the item to its future owner. This knowledge is revealed in
paradigms of time, action, and risk.
1. Time: Remedies Disclosed Before and After Risk of Loss
Causing Event
Commercial actors know certain remedies before they enter
into the transaction. Notably, there are three prominent
examples of pre-transaction knowledge that serve to encourage
commercial actors to make deals: (1) the holder in due course
doctrine 121; (2) the secured creditor's access to the filing system to
discover other potential secured creditors with greater priority122;
121 U.C.C. § 3-302. A good-faith purchaser of a negotiable instrument without
notice of competing claims to the instrument can become a holder in due course.
Edward J. Janger, The Costs of Liquidity Enhancement: Transparency Cost, Risk
Alteration, and Coordination Problems, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 39, 41
(2009). The holder in due course doctrine allocates risk efficiently in that it imposes
liability on the lower cost avoider: The transferee of an obligation becomes a holder
in due course over an obligor. Marie T. Reilly, The FDIC as Holder in Due Course:
Some Law and Economics, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 165, 211 (1992). The holder in
due course "is immune from all competing claims of ownership of and virtually all
defenses to the obligation." Id. at 204. The doctrine encourages efficiency by placing
the burden on the party that could have more easily avoided the loss and more
cheaply insured against it. Id. Other byproducts of the doctrine are enhanced
certainty and liquidity in the market; the holder in due course owns good title free of
any worries of the creditworthiness of the obligor. Janger, supra, at 46.
122 U.C.C. § 9-501. Creditors can protect their financial interest against debtors
by securing the debt through filing a UCC-1 financial statement in the state in
which the debtor is registered. David D. Farrell, Post-Filing Changes and Their
Impact on the Continued Perfection of Security Interests, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18,
18 (2002). Once filed, the first-in-time secured creditor takes first priority against
any subsequent debtors through a process called "perfecting." See generally Egon
Guttman, Investment Securities as Collateral, 36 UCC L.J. 3 (2004). However, the
secured creditor is burdened with the task of monitoring the moves or name changes
on the debtor's part, either of which could negate the perfecting of the priority and
require the once-secured creditor to re-file or lose the protection. Farrell, supra, at
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and (3) the consumer's implied warranty to ensure his bargain is
fit and merchantable. 123
The holder in due course doctrine encourages the purchase of
commercial paper by ensuring that the purchaser can enforce the
note against its maker, regardless of personal defenses that may
exist. 124  The holder in due course obtains his status by giving
value for an instrument to a holder without notice of defenses. 25
Notably, the holder in due course knows at the time he purchases
the instrument that he will be able to enforce the instrument in
the normal course against the maker or negotiate the instrument
to another holder in due course for value. 126  This pre-
transactional knowledge provides the holder in due course with
certainty that the value the holder expends for the note will be
compensated. 27
Likewise, the ability of a creditor under Article 9 to know
that the creditor has priority before ever lending money to a
debtor provides the lender with a substantial level of certainty
that the transaction will provide value. 28  The conscientious
40. Establishing first priority in the security interest encourages financial confidence
to facilitate lending to the debtor. Emilie Beavers, Note, Bankruptcy Law
Harmonization in the NAFTA Countries: The Case of the United States and Mexico,
2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 965, 991 (2003).
123 U.C.C. §§ 2-314, -315; see also Marc L. Roark, Limitation of Sales Warranties
as an Alternative to Intellectual Property Rights: An Empirical Analysis of iPhone
Warranties' Deterrent Impact on Consumers, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, $88
(2010) (providing empirical data suggesting that consumer understanding of
warranties enhances sales).
124 U.C.C. §§ 3-302, -305(2).
125 Id. §§ 3-302(2), -304(4)(a).
126 Id. § 3-305. Not only does the holder in due course gain title to the negotiable
instrument free from all other claims to it, but also free from all third-party
defenses. Thomas B. Fiddler, Note and Comment, An Argument for the Alteration of
the UCC To Include Variable Rate Notes as Negotiable Instruments, 9 J.L. & COM.
115, 119 (1989). The holder in due course doctrine developed as a means of
assurance to creditor-buyers that the security interest was both certain and
enforceable. Boris Kozolchyk & John M. Wilson, The Organization of American
States' Model Inter-American Law on Secured Transactions, 36 UCC L.J. art. 2
(2003).
27 The holder in due course has the most superior claim the law affords
consumers, higher than even the secured creditor's. Curtis Nyquist, A Spectrum
Theory of Negotiability, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 897, 909 (1995). Article 9 does not limit
the immunity to claims granted the holder in due course in Article 3. Id.
11 Secured creditors take priority over involuntary creditors to promote
liquidity and efficiency of resource allocation in the financial arena. Willa E. Gibson,
Banks Reign Supreme Under Revised Article 9 Deposit Account Rules, 30 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 819, 853 (2005). Absent Article 9 priority protection, lenders would be
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creditor will file a financing statement and will search the filing
system to determine whether the debtor has given other security
interests in the same collateral to other creditors. 129 Importantly,
the secured creditor has the capacity to secure an investment
before ever extending value to the debtor. 3 ° With few exceptions,
even though the security interest does not attach until value is
given, the UCC provides that the creditor's priority relates back
to the creditor's properly pre-filed UCC-1 statement. 3'
One area where the UCC creates this pre-transaction
security for consumers is in the area of consumer warranties.
Under UCC 2-314 and UCC 2-315, consumers purchasing goods
under a contract of sale receive implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.3 2 And like
the holder in due course doctrine, a security interest creates
certainty in the lending transaction; the presence of basic implied
warranties assures consumers of a base-line of certainties
regarding their sales transaction. 133  What is more, federal
consumer protection legislation relating to warranties requires
that merchants provide a certain base-line of warranty protection
when they claim to provide full or limited warranties.3 Should
the merchant decide to limit or disclaim implied warranties, this
disclaimer must be clear, in certain instances identify the type of
warranty to be limited or disclaimed, and, most importantly,
must arise before the transaction. 135
reluctant to extend credit "because lien creditors' interests might trump their now
unsecured interest in the event of bankruptcy or default."Id. at 853-54.
129 U.C.C. § 9-510.
130 Id. §§ 9-502(d), -509(b).
131 Id. § 9-502(d). Exceptions include where other creditors give value in reliance
on erroneous filings. Id. § 9-338.
132 See generally Roark, supra note 123 (providing empirical data suggesting
that consumer understanding of warranties enhances sales). However, merely
providing better warranties may not always lead to enhanced consumer information.
For example, in a 1979 empirical study of consumer warranties, before the passage
of the Magnuson-Moss Act--federal legislation designed to provide minimum
standards for written warranties-consumers reported continued dissatisfaction
from dense and confusing language. See Michael J. Wisdom, Note, An Empirical
Study of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1117, 1146 (1979).
'S' See Roark, supra note 123 (providing empirical data suggesting that
consumer understanding of warranties enhances sales).
134 Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2012).
135 Id. §§ 2303-2305.
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That we would create remedies that arise before the loss-
causing event ever occurs suggests some questions about the
nature of commercial contracting and certainty. For example,
why do we provide for the availability of certain remedies at the
outset of a transaction? Is it because we believe that people will
not undertake the transaction without certain assurances of
performance, like the warranty, the holder in due course
protection, or the security interest? Or could it be a question of
fairness-that we recognize certain actors have better knowledge
of the likely successful completion of the transaction, and,
therefore, by creating avenues of remedies, we allow parties to
secure themselves against unknown risks that may be well
known to other parties? In reality, both concerns bolster the role
of pre-transactional remedies. It is the latter, however, that
often receives little discussion as a policy-animating principle.
2. Action: Remedies That Require an Act, Remedies Available
Without an Act, and the Disabling of Remedies.
Besides the paradigm of time, certain commercial remedies
arise because actors undertake certain actions. But
interestingly, the UCC's holistic scheme of remedies embodies
not only action necessary to make a remedy available, but also
includes instances in which no action is needed and in which
action is irrelevant to the party's rights and remedies. For
example, the secured creditor must file a financing statement
and execute a security agreement; 136 and the holder in due course
must give value and avoid knowledge of other defenses.137 But
sometimes, the secured creditor need not file a financing
statement to perfect a security interest,1 3 and sometimes the
holder in due course need not complete all of the formalities
131 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-510 (describing conditions for a properly filed financing
statement); Id. § 9-317 (stating the priority scheme for a properly filed financing
statement).
137 Id. § 3-302 (providing the requirements for a holder in due course as giving
value, without knowledge of defenses, amongst others).
I- See, e.g., id. § 9-324 (providing an exception for purchase money creditors to
the general priority scheme).
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necessary to enforce rights as a holder in due course. 139 And
sometimes, even taking necessary steps, both find themselves
without recourse to remedies they contemplated. 140
The secured creditor takes significant steps to ensure that its
security interest remains intact. It may initially request the
debtor to authorize the filing of a financing statement, file the
statement, and then search to ensure that the debtor has not
granted a security interest in the same or similar collateral to
other creditors."' Then, upon the execution of a security
agreement by the debtor and the extension of value, the creditor's
interest may be perfected.' Likewise, the holder in due course
must extend value and obtain the instrument from a holder. 143
These acts by the creditor and holder in due course are not mere
formalities but, rather, represent affirmative steps they take to
ensure that their value will be secured once value is extended.
Conversely, if a seller does not want to honor implied warranties
to consumers, the UCC requires that he take specific action to
limit the remedy-specific action designed to alert the consumer
that the consumer's expectation of a warranty will not be
fulfilled.'1 Action, in other words, provides signals to parties-
both direct parties to the transaction and other parties who may
become involved-that creditors, sellers, and consumers have
expectations that drew them into the transaction.
19 See, e.g., id. § 3-301 (providing the basic shelter rule for purchasers of
instruments); Timothy R. Zinnecker, Extending Enforcement Rights to Assignees of
Lost, Destroyed, or Stolen Negotiable Instruments Under U. C. C. Article 3: A Proposal
for Reform, 50 U. KAN. L. REV 111, 120 (2001).
140 Article 9 provides for a number of exceptions to the secured creditor's filing.
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-320 (providing an exception to the general rule that security
interests continue in collateral after disposition for consumer disposition of secured
collateral); id. § 9-323 (providing that secured creditors of future advances may be
subject to lien creditors); id. § 9-338 (providing that errors or omissions in financing
statements may reduce subordinate secured creditors to later filing creditors who
rely on the error or absence of information). Likewise, a holder in due course may be
subject to a maker who can assert real defenses or who is insolvent. See, e.g., id. § 3-
305(a)-(b).
141 See, e.g., id. §§ 9-509, -322.
142 Id. § 9-203(a)-(b).
' Id. § 3-302(a)(2)(i).
4 Id. § 2-316 (providing for the means for excluding or modifying implied
warranties).
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Sometimes, though, we allow creditors and purchasers of
commercial paper to enforce rights as a secured party or a holder
in due course without undertaking the same formal steps.145 For
example, the UCC allows for sellers who extend purchase money
credit for the purchase of consumer goods to take priority over
other creditors, even without filing a UCC-1 statement or
otherwise giving any public notice. 146  Likewise, when debtors
exchange the collateral for other goods, or sell the collateral for
proceeds, the UCC attaches the security interest to those new
goods or proceeds, often without the creditor having to undertake
any new action. 14  Similarly, a purchaser of commercial paper
from a holder in due course may enforce the rights of a holder in
due course, even if the purchaser does not meet all of the formal
requirements for being a holder in due course. 48
And sometimes, the UCC, legislation, and courts disable the
rights of these parties, even when they have meticulously
followed the formal actions required to obtain their status. For
example, both purchasers of commercial paper and secured
creditors may find their interests set aside if the debtor or maker
of the note files for bankruptcy protection.'49 The holder in due
course, while able to avoid personal defenses may not avoid real
defenses of the maker, of which bankruptcy is one. 5 ° Moreover,
the UCC generally disables the holder in due course enforcement
if the maker is a consumer. 5 1 The secured creditor that gives
value within a forty-five day window of a debtor declaring
bankruptcy may find its security interest set aside in favor of
other unsecured creditors.'52 Sometimes, we disable security
interests because we believe they are unfair to consumers. For
example, as a general rule creditors may not create a security
interest in after-acquired property held by consumers unless the
145 See, e.g., id. § 9-324 (providing for a purchase money security interest
exception to the normal priority scheme of U.C.C. § 9-317).
146 Id. § 9-324(a).
147 See, e.g., id. § 9-315 (providing for automatic perfection for proceed); id. § 9-
102(a)(64) (defining proceeds).
"I See, e.g., id. § 3-301 (2002) (providing the shelter doctrine for purchasers of
instruments).
149 See, e.g., id. § 9-323(b) (2010) (providing exceptions for lien creditors on
future advances).
10 See, e.g., id. § 3-305(a)-(b) (providing exceptions to holder in due course for
real defenses and insolvency).
"I See id. § 3-305(e); 16 C.F.R. § 433.3(a) (2014).
152 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-323(b).
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interest attaches within ten days after the secured party extends
value. 53 Likewise, a secured creditor who asserts automatic
perfection of a purchase money security interest may find his
interest in the collateral dissolved if the consumer sells the
collateral to another consumer, and the creditor did not file a
UCC-1 statement on the item.1 5
4
Explaining why these paradigms of action, inaction, and
irrelevant action exist within the UCC can at times seem to be a
patchwork of consumer protection, distributive justice, and
contractual fairness. I argue, that like the question of timing,
the animating principle underlying the UCC is the protection of
consumers and creditors from secret knowledge that would
otherwise have deterred their choice to engage in the transaction.
3. Risk: Remedy Structures Allow Parties To Assess the
Likelihood of Breach
Taking a step back and considering the nature of commercial
law remedies and contractual obligations, one might suggest that
commercial contracting is largely about risk management. The
seller that passes risk of loss according to the terms of the
contract puts the buyer on notice at the point where the buyer is
bound to insure against the risk of loss. 155 Lenders choose how to
mitigate their risk, whether they accept a security interest in
goods, charge higher rates of interest, or both, as mechanisms for
insuring against the debtor's default.'56  Purchasers of
commercial paper have the capacity to evaluate the instrument
before making the purchase; doing so enables the purchaser to
determine not only who else remains liable on the instrument
should the maker fail to pay the obligation, but also to evaluate
their risk worthiness in the transaction.'57 I want to offer two
'5 See, e.g., id. § 9-204(b)(1).
154 Id. § 9-320(b).
155 In sales, risk of loss is transferred as a contractual matter using conventions
known as "Incoterms" to designate when parties are responsible for assuming the
risk of loss in transport. 7 C.F.R. § 1493.410(o) (2014); see, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-319 (F.O.B
and F.A.S. Incoterms); id. § 2-320 (C.I.F. and C. & F. Incoterms); id. § 2-321 (on-
arrival Incoterm).
156 See generally Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110
HARV. L. REv. 625 (1997) (providing empirical reports regarding why creditors and
borrowers choose secured credit or choose to not use secured credit to secure a loan).
117 See U.C.C. § 3-201 (requiring that an instrument be negotiated provided the
purchaser with a party to whom endorsement liability will apply under UCC
sections 3-204 and 3-401).
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examples as to how the UCC aids parties in evaluating the risk
worthiness of a transaction: (1) the limits of remedy substitution
for sales, particularly those that fail their essential purpose; and
(2) the limitation of matters that may be waived by a debtor
under Article 9.
One way that merchants control risk in a transaction is by
limiting the types of liability they may be subject to should the
transaction fail. This control of risk is subject to three major
limitations under Article 2. First, the parties may agree on a
liquidated damages amount, as long as the amount is not
"unreasonably large." 58 Second, merchants may contractually
modify or limit remedies provided in the UCC as long as those
new remedies do not "fail [their] essential purpose."1 59 Lastly,
merchants may not limit their exposure to consequential
damages when such limitation is unconscionable; notably, the
only named unconscionable limitation is the limitation of
consequential damages for personal injury where the goods sold
are consumer goods. 6 °
Like Article 2's limitations on merchants in sales, Article 9
limits creditors' ability to force a debtor to waive certain
protections afforded by the UCC.' 6 ' One prominent limitation is
the inability of consumers to waive the obligation that creditors
not "breach... the peace" when using self-help foreclosure to
reclaim collateral.'62 This limitation ensures that creditors play
fairly-at least to a certain threshold for what fair play might
mean within the context of repossession of the goods.
These limitations on merchants and creditors reflect the
UCC's viewpoint that even arms-length bargaining can be less
than fair-at least as we might collectively measure the
transaction's fairness. That consequential damages for bodily
injuries and breaches of the peace are things that parties cannot
158 Id. § 2-718(1).
'59 Id. § 2-719(2).
'60 Id. § 2-719(3).
161 See, e.g., id. § 9-602 (limiting the ability of secured creditors to alter
provisions of Article 9).
162 U.C.C. § 9-609(b)(2); see also Pride Hyundai, Inc. v. Chrysler Fin. Co., 369
F.3d 603, 613 (1st Cir. 2004); Clarin v. Minn. Repossessors, Inc., 198 F.3d 661, 664
(8th Cir. 1999); Giles v. First Va. Credit Servs., 560 S.E.2d 557, 565 (N.C. Ct. App.
2002); Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Tenn., 958 S.W.2d 113, 116 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1997); Davenport v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 818 S.W.2d 23, 29 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1991); Chapa v. Traciers & Assocs., Inc., 267 S.W.3d 386, 389 (Tex. App. 2008).
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avoid, even with thorough contracting, suggests that inherent in
the contracting process is an understanding that certain risks
should not be subject to contractual bargaining.
B. Payments and the Policies of Liquidity and Certainty
At the core of payments policy is the desire that non-
currency payments be as currency-like as they can. This desire is
built around the two cornerstones of promoting liquidity and
certainty in the payments market.163 Indeed, the two are not
necessarily unconnected, as payments that offer instant liquidity
also provide instant certainty to merchants and creditors. These
two policy goals also create and rely on three distinct, yet related,
concepts: Payments policy creates several interrelated goals for
those engaging in the payments market-namely the goals of
efficiency, trust, and longevity.
Figure 1-Liquidity and Certainty
Between liquidity and certainty lie policy constructs that
undergird both. Both liquidity and certainty create these by-
products inasmuch as they rely upon them. Merchants that use
163 Mann, supra note 10.
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payments instruments come to rely on their accuracy in
affirming that the payment is indeed good. Accuracy is
facilitated by a banking relationship the merchant trusts,
thereby prompting the merchant to accept more payments
verified by this merchant. Moreover, the faster the merchant is
able to respond-in today's economy, almost instantly-and
length of time the merchant sustains a relationship with the
intermediary will prompt other transactions that the merchant
can confidently accept.
Consumers in turn expect payments to process quickly since
merchants are usually hesitant to hand over goods when
payments have not been confirmed. Customers seek certainty
that the payment medium is trustworthy. Longevity in the
market affirms the consumer's belief that the medium is
trustworthy.
Indeed, we expect payments policy to overlap in this way and
even acknowledge it is happening. Liquidity is said to create
certainty itself; certainty is a requisite of liquidity. Without
either, the market in payments would lack the speed, trust, and
longevity to provide currency-like attributes to its users and vice
versa. Lather, rinse, repeat. The market thrives on these
byproducts producing more liquidity and certainty for the
market's functionality. Indeed, a careful inspection of past
payments systems problems reveals the three constructs
undergirding the overlapping policy concerns of liquidity and
certainty. Importantly, any solution must account for these
policies to preserve economic efficiency of payments.
1. Longevity: A Product of Liquidity and Certainty
One of the most important results of enhanced liquidity and
certainty in the market is the enhanced longevity of payments on
the market. Consider an example provided by Ronald Mann in
1997:
[Posit a clothier ("Clothier") attempting to purchase wool from
a wool merchant ("Merchant"). Clothier's principal source of
income is from the sale of finished clothes to a factor ("Factor")
that is in the business of buying finished clothes and reselling
them to retailers. In an economy in which cash was the sole
nonbarter payment medium, Clothier probably would obtain
cash by selling finished clothes to Factor, and then would use
that cash to pay Merchant for the wool. It would be
considerably more convenient, however (particularly in
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economies that are short of cash), if Clothier could pay
Merchant with a bill of exchange (or some other form of
instrument); with a documentary noncash payment, Clothier
could pay Merchant without first obtaining cash from Factor.
In the typical transaction using a negotiable instrument,
Clothier would pay Merchant with a "draft" drawn on Factor.
The draft would represent funds that Factor already owes, or in
the future might owe, to Clothier for clothes purchased, or to be
purchased, from Clothier. Merchant, in turn, could obtain cash
by seeking payment from Factor or by selling the draft to a
third party. Alternatively, Merchant could use the draft to pay
for other goods and services it purchased from a third party. 164
The essence of longevity within the spheres of liquidity and
certainty is the multi-faceted use that payments serve in the
market place. Indeed, as Mann notes, payments may be used as
a means of leveraging current assets by passing on debts to
others who are charged to pay on your behalf.165 In a system that
encourages both liquidity and certainty, merchants are free to
invest their assets towards expansion, which facilitates wealth
creation.
Importantly, the longevity achieved through liquidity and
certainty is at every level of the transaction. Once the
instrument is granted certain features that extend its life beyond
the pale of the single transaction, use of the payment instrument
to facilitate other parties' leveraging and wealth creation spreads
the impact of the instrument beyond the initial transaction. 66
Thus, the great innovation of Article 9 has been the expansion in
the 1999 revision of accounts-based lending; the facilitation of
lending through indispensible documents, such as chattel
mortgages, realty mortgages, promissory notes, payment
intangibles, as well as instruments; and the simplification of
creating security interests in other receivable type assets, such
1'6 Id. at 956-57 (footnotes omitted).
165 Id.
166 The incorporation of accounts financing and the expansion of negotiable
documents financing have been heralded as the two preeminent innovations of the
1999 revision of Article 9. See, e.g., Jean Wegman Bums, New Article 9 of the UCC:
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 29, 42-43 (2002) (noting two
of the advancements are the ability to create a security interest in instruments and
new rules pertaining to mortgage and promissory note documents).
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as healthcare receipts, insurance receivables, and intellectual
property licensing accounts. 167  By stretching the transaction
outward, the payment has become more liquid.
In turn though, payment exchanges have also become more
certain. Through the acceptance of payments in forms other than
cash-the liquefying of non-cash items-merchants inure more
certainty to the system, thereby creating longer life for
instruments of payment. 168  The longer that merchants utilize
such systems, the more networked payments policy becomes.
Consider our example above of the Clothier, Merchant, and
Factor. Obviously the transaction's longevity is limited by its
network of potential asset holders. If, for example, Merchant's
creditors do not trust a non-cash payment in exchange for
Merchant's goods, then the network of potential users is limited.
In other words, payment systems, even in their most basic form,
require networks to achieve maximum longevity and usefulness.
Someone in the circle of Merchant-Clothier-Factor must enlarge
the circle of transactors to include an intermediary capable of
expanding the network.
In traditional commerce, this role has been played by banks
facilitating payments longevity through vast networks of
creditors and debtors. 69  In recent years, the longevity of
payments has shifted from the instrument's longevity to the
intermediary's longevity in the market. We have seen this effect
in two major areas: the expansion of credit card/plastic payments
and the creation of non-bank third-party intermediaries.
167 See, e.g., Pauline Stevens, The Intersection of Film Finance and Revised
Article 9: A Mystery, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 211, 216 (2002) (detailing how the
expansion of Article 9 facilitated greater access to capital through such things as
promissory notes, true consignments, and payment intangibles).
168 Mann, supra note 10.
169 Traditionally, payments like credit cards or debit cards were aided by a
third-party intermediary that facilitated the trust of the consumer. As stated by one
scholar:
Because a payment card network can arise only with concurrent
participation by three groups of entities, the institutional environment that
will support the deployment of payment cards must be one that includes
favorable conditions ... for participation by financial institutions that issue
the cards, by merchants that accept the cards, and by consumers that carry
them.
Barr, supra note 10, at 205 n.414. As noted however, Starbucks and other closed-loop




Credit card and plastic payments transactions have been on
the rise since the early 1990s. 7 ' For example, in 1991, the total
number of consumer payments in credit card transactions was
just under $750 billion. 171  By 2005, that amount had risen to
around $2.5 trillion, while corresponding payments in cash and
checks had both declined in the same time period.172 In a study
sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, a focus
group of consumer spenders reported that their use of plastic
mediums of exchange increased from seventy-eight percent in
2000 to ninety-one percent in 2008.113 A third study, conducted
by the Federal Reserve, found that between the years 2003 and
2006, non-cash payments increased 4.6%, while the number of
checks written during that period declined by 4.1%; both debit
card and credit card usage increased during that period.
174
Interestingly, consumers who reported the increase in plastic
mediums of exchange during these periods also noted that
merchant acceptance was one impediment to using debit or credit
cards more frequently; merchant acceptance or refusal to accept
plastic cards as means of exchange had a direct effect on the
source of payments used.175 In short, the lack of networked
merchants slowed the expansion of plastic payment exchange as
consumers reported that they would have used the medium more
often but for the lack of conduits for using the medium of
exchange. This lack of networked merchants is also revealed by
the decline in private-label card use and the expansion of
general-purpose credit cards. As the report describes:
[R]etailers, including Dillard's, Target, Sears, Kohl's, and
Nieman Marcus, have divested their proprietary card programs
170 RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 31 fig.I.3 (5th ed. 2011).
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 HERBST-MURPHY, supra note 2, at 3.
174 FED RESERVE Sys., THE 2007 FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY 6 (2007).
Note that in the study, the total value of payments was skewed because of the high
proportion of payments made by checks in the business sector. See HERBST-MURPHY,
supra note 2, at 4.
175 See HERBST-MURPHY, supra note 2, at 4-5 (stating that in the categories of
both debit and credit transactions, consumers noted the lack of merchants accepting
plastic forms of exchange as the primary reason parties did not use plastic
exchanges more). For example, in the context of debit transactions, thirty-six




as a means of infusing cash or offiloading management of their
loan portfolios, which have become more problematic over time,
generating charge-offs running about 180 basis points higher
than the GPCC average.176
The retailer's solution has been to partner with general purpose
credit cards rather than shoulder the burden of operating their
own proprietary card program. 177
In short, as the emergence and proliferation of plastic
mediums of exchange have demonstrated, the liquidity-or
virtual cash-like availability of exchange-together with the
certainty of its value have created sustained growth and
longevity in the use of plastic exchanges in the overall market.
This growth and longevity is in part due to the perception in the
market that companies like Visa, MasterCard, and, to a lesser
extent, American Express and Discover, represent longevity in
the market that individual merchants want to tap into.
Consumers, too, recognize that their credit profiles are perhaps
best served by consolidated payments in instruments that have
greater market longevity than isolated payments that may offer
temporary perks. 178 Indeed, through airline miles, cash rebates,
and other rewards programs, general purpose credit cards have
managed to expand the life of a single credit purchase making
dollars spent and airline miles exchanged a seamless, liquid, and
certain transaction. 1
79
SVPs like the Starbucks card also afford consumers benefits
for maintaining long-standing relationships with the merchants
rather than short-term single transaction relationships.
Starbucks "rewards" consumers with free drinks, free add-ons,
and other perks for loading, reloading, and using their Starbucks
card for coffee transactions. Starbucks in turn continues to reap
the ongoing benefits of this relationship: both a growing customer
base and a significant ongoing asset, capable of being leveraged
towards its growth and expansion.
176 See id. at 6 (footnote omitted). Murphy notes that private label credit cards
declined from over 23% to 11.4% between 1990 and 2008. During that time, the
number of private label cards peaked at 585 million in 2002 and then declined to 494
million by 2007. See generally THE NILSON REPORT, Issue 913, Oct. 2008.
177 See HERBST-MURPHY, supra note 2, at 6.
178 See id. at 6 (describing the turn in consumer spending patterns away from
one-time, perk-based, private credit cards, such as Kohl's, Dillards, Target, or Sears,
to expanded rewards available in general purpose credit cards).
179 Id. at 5-6.
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2. Confidence: A Product of Liquidity and Certainty
Just as longevity is an important product of liquidity and
certainty, confidence and trust are equally important. For
payments to work smoothly, merchants require certainty. Over
time, that certainty creates institutional trust that the payments
they accept will be honored or enforceable. That trust builds
confidence into the system of payments, prompting more users to
engage in particular payments types. Again-lather, rinse,
repeat. Consider Mann's tale of the Clothier, Merchant, and
Factor's use of negotiable bills of exchange in extended
transactions.
From an economic perspective, the biggest problem with that
arrangement is the difficulty in which it places Merchant: how
can Merchant be sure that Factor or anybody else will be willing
to give Merchant money or other valuable goods and services in
exchange for the draft? Absent some strong reason to expect
that the draft will be valuable, Merchant will be unlikely to
accept the draft without insisting upon a substantial premium
over the price at which it would sell goods for cash. The rules of
negotiability respond directly to that problem by making it
easier for Merchant to sell the draft-by enhancing its
liquidity.' s°
Enhanced liquidity through negotiability and nearly
instantaneous transactions has prompted greater certainty in the
payments system. Legal innovations such as negotiability, the
holder in due course doctrine, merger doctrine, and the ease of
creating security interests in payment devices such as
instruments and accounts have led to greater certainty and
therefore greater liquidity. Likewise, technical innovations,
which have led to point of sale technology, and instantaneous
acceptance of checks through technical and legal innovation have
bolstered confidence in payments received. Fundamental to
these innovations is the trust that merchants, purchasers, and
payment-intermediaries have that either quick decisions
regarding the payments' effectiveness or the known negotiable
impacts of discounting paper will not result in losses from
unscrupulous payments. In short, underlying these assumptions
is Merchant's-and others'-trust that the investment it makes
in an instrument or acceptance of credit from an intermediary
"' See Mann, supra note 10, at 957.
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will not go unpaid. Longevity provides Merchant and other
transactors with tangible experience to rely upon in engaging in
these transactions.
In the past, payments systems built confidence and trust
through rules relating to negotiability of notes. The premise that
the instrument itself could inure confidence of payment afforded
third parties-and in particular networked intermediaries-the
leverage to discount the note at competitive rates-not rates that
reflect higher risk-which in turn meant that the note's
usefulness as a tool of value would last beyond the scope of the
initial debt."' l This network effect of confidence produced not
only confidence in dealing with third parties-a macro network of
transactors-but also inured confidence to closed off networks.
The confidence of liquidity and certainty in instruments allowed
the various airlines to trust that cashing a check for another
airlines employee would not result in a loss to them.
But as payments have shifted from primarily commercial
paper payments to electronic payments, confidence too has
shifted. Instead of confidence that is bolstered because a paper
satisfies the rules of negotiability and therefore maintains
liquidity, confidence in electronic payments is prompted almost
solely through confidence in the intermediary handling the
payments. 8 2 We can perceive the confidence effect of network
expansion in the near universal acceptance of credit cards.
Credit cards are accepted in most places today, including non-
national retail stores, gas stations, doctor's offices, automobile
service centers, hair salons, fast-food outlets, and drug and
grocery stores. The speed by which merchants learn of credit
payment decisions is instantaneous, prompting greater trust in
the system. The network, though not perfectly liquid, achieves
near liquidity by its popularity. 8 3  The closed network of
individual credit card companies is promoted by technology that
allows the near universality of the payment medium, thus
achieving near liquidity status."M
1 See Gregory E. Maggs, The Holder in Due Course Doctrine as a Default Rule,
32 GA. L. REV. 783, 785 (1998) (noting the holding in due course doctrine encouraged
the extension of value beyond the initial transaction).
182 Barr, supra note 10, at 205 n.414.




And like the effect that negotiability had in inuring
confidence in closed networks, so too closed networks operate
closely with near universal networks to create better confidence
in the system. Consider the PayPal evolution. PayPal developed
as a void in the market of online exchanges emerged.1 5
Purchasers in Iowa seeking to purchase goods from a merchant
in California were reticent to simply issue a payment on the hope
that the goods would arrive. Similarly, merchant did not desire
to ship goods to buyer without having the certainty of payment in
hand. In short, a trust problem emerged. PayPal offered a
simple way to resolve the trust issue. By depositing funds into a
PayPal account, users could transfer funds between other uses.'
Moreover, PayPal as intermediary guaranteed satisfaction of
customers by promising to return funds if unsatisfied with the
product." 7  Notice two things. First, the PayPal network is a
micro-network because it is limited by the parties connected to
PayPal.'8 8 PayPal took advantage of a macro network in the form
of electronic funds transfers to establish the PayPal accounts.'8 9
Now, as electronic funds transfers have become more trusted,
PayPal's limited network has also expanded. Second, and
perhaps more important to this discussion, PayPal properly
identified the trust aspect of distance transactions and provided
a sensible solution. In many ways mirroring what banks have
done with letters of credit, PayPal offered recourse to unsatisfied
consumers. 190
This solution is not unusual, as we have long noticed that
concepts like liquidity and certainty benefit the immediate
transaction by making the paper worth more as an investment
tool than as a medium of payment. Confidence and longevity
stream forwards and backwards within the transaction, thanks
in part to the third construct-speed or efficiency. 191
185 See Kaminski, supra note 106, at 375-76; Ronald J. Mann, Regulating
Internet Payment Intermediaries, 82 TEX. L. REV. 681, 683 (2004).
1 Mann, supra note 185, at 684-85.
187 See David E. Sorkin, Payment Methods for Consumer-to-Consumer Online
Transactions, 35 AKRON L. REV. 1, 25 & n.129 (2001).
1' Kaminski, supra note 106, at 375-76.
189 Id.
'1 Mann, supra note 185, at 687.
191 Normally, efficiency is referred to as stripping away obstacles from a
transaction. For example, we might describe an output as efficient because it tends
to create greater negotiability by stripping away potential defenses. See Mann,
supra note 10, at 959. However, one often overlooked aspect of efficiency is the speed
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3. Efficiency: A Product of Liquidity and Certainty
The third construct in the diagram is efficiency. Edward
Rubin at the dawn of the 1990 revision of Article 3 and 4 stated
efficiency's lure best: "No sane person engages in payment
activities for the intrinsic pleasure of doing so. Payments are a
means to an independently determined end. In order to obtain
goods or services in a commercial culture like our own, one must
pay for them."1 92  The speed by which payment systems may
provide that end ties directly to the mutual confidence that
consumers and sellers place in a particular payment medium. 9 '
For example, prior to the expansion of credit cards as a primary
means of payments, many merchants placed restrictions on the
use of checks as a means of payments, like "no out of town
checks" or "no check numbers below 100." The problem was one
of timing-verification of funds could take days, even weeks,
prompting merchants not to trust strangers or inexperienced
transactors.
As Mann notes, doctrines like merger and holder in due
course allow sellers, sellers' creditors, assignees, or purchasers to
evaluate the note immediately and determine its immediate
worth by simplifying the potential issues against which they
might not be paid:
When a document is negotiable, substantially all of the
information necessary to evaluate title to the asset appears on
the face of the document in its original terms or in indorsements
subsequently placed on the document. At least in the absence of
forgery, a person who wishes to purchase a negotiable document
can verify that the purported seller can convey good title
without any inquiry other than the examination of the
document. If the document is in bearer form, then mere
possession is enough to obtain title. The inquiry is more
complicated if the document is in order form, but even then the
buyer need only examine the document (including any
with which transactions can take place. Systems that offer greater liquidity also, in
turn, offer speedier processes by which merchants make decisions whether the
payment offered is sufficient. In the practical context, merchants that conclude the
liquidity of the consumer by virtue of instantaneous credit decisions are able to
decide much faster whether the transaction is one they would choose to undertake.
192 Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and
4, 42 ALA. L. REV. 551, 561 (1991).
19' See, e.g., Bowling Green, Inc. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 425 F.2d 81, 85
(1st Cir. 1970) (noting that in regards to the check, "maker, payee, and endorsers
[sic] of a check naturally expect it will be rapidly negotiated and collected").
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indorsements that appear on the document) to determine
whether the seller is the person to whose order the document
runs. If so, the seller can convey title to the purchaser by the
simple acts of indorsement and delivery of the document.'
Yet, this simplification of issues did not alleviate all concerns
with the instrument. Merchants keenly realized that they could
be delivering goods to customers without any guarantee of
payment.
The proliferation of credit cards has alleviated some concerns
of merchants by providing instant feedback regarding the
"transaction-worthiness" of their consumer. Likewise, this
instantaneous feedback has netted a positive impact on consumer
behavior where consumers now use credit cards because they can
assure themselves that the transaction will be completed-
assuming of course that the consumers do not misperceive
information they hold that the merchant is privy to, like the fact
that their credit lines are over the limit, or that they have failed
to pay the balance due on their credit lines. Of course, these
pieces of information, though not provided directly to the
merchant, are provided indirectly in the form of denying the
credit of the consumer prior to completing the transaction.
Like credit and debit card transactions, consumers and
merchants are privy to instant feedback of their transaction in an
SVP setting. When the SVP is combined with mobile technology,
the transaction is even more efficient since the consumers are
aware before initiating the transaction whether they have the
funds sufficient to conduct the purchase. These provide both
consumer and merchant instant knowledge as to whether their
transaction will be successful-a feature that inures the SVP for
both its liquidity and certainty.
III. How SVP REMEDIES MIGHT ACCOUNT FOR COMMERCIAL AND
PAYMENT LAW PARADIGMS
Because SVPs can be construed as a consumer contract, pre-
sale, a lending agreement, and a payment mechanism, any
remedy proposed to mitigate an imbalance between consumer
and merchant should attempt to balance the policy aims of each
of these. This Article to this point has argued that consumers
are most at risk from: (1) unknown information at the outset of
194 See Mann, supra note 10, at 960 (footnotes omitted).
2014]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the transaction; and (2) inadequate protection against merchant
failure, for whom the risk of loss has not been adequately
contemplated. Indeed, the consumer's post-loss actions often
leave the consumer with little or no realistic remedy to pursue.
Moreover, if known, they would challenge at least one of the
policy ends we seek to further in payment systems-creation of
confidence-building mechanisms.
Instead, consumer remedies should be available to
consumers at the outset of the transaction. This knowledge of
consumer remedies would build confidence in the SVP as a
payment mechanism, reduce the perception of risk in the
transaction, and balance the fairness of the transaction. In
crafting an appropriate remedy for consumers in the SVP
market, we might consider how individual problems raised by the
SVP could be resolved. But in solving one problem, we do not
necessarily resolve the others. For example, we could insure
against the risk of loss, spreading the risk between consumer and
merchant to insure that the merchant maintains adequate funds
in the event of a merchant breach of terms; this approach,
however, would likely not be an adequate solution to the
merchant insolvency. We could impose an affirmative remedy by
giving consumers legal entitlements that they could assert in a
post-insolvency period, but which they would unlikely pursue in
a merchant breach scenario, though they could. We could disable
certain entitlements by the merchant which would insulate the
consumer from loss in the event of the merchant insolvency, but
which would afford the consumer no remedy in itself where the
merchant breaches the terms of the transaction outside of
insolvency. And we could provide mechanisms to insulate
consumers for losses due to third-party wrongdoers, similar to
EFTA's notice regime. But each of these solutions is a single
solution to a broader problem. For a solution to fully protect
consumers at all levels, reform must be comprehensive, touching
not one piece of the problem, but all facets.
A. Insuring Against the Merchant's Default.
One means of protecting against merchant breach is to
insure against the loss at the outset of the transaction.
Merchants could be required to hold in reserve a certain
percentage of receipts depending on the total value of funds the
merchant holds in the aggregate on behalf of consumers.
[Vol. 88:39
PAYMENT SYSTEMS
Alternatively, merchants could be required to insure funds
through a third-party insurer who could insure a portion of the
total receipts for consumers that elect coverage in exchange for a
premium.
Both of these approaches have distinctive downfalls.
Following the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation model
might impose significant administrative and reporting
requirements on merchants that could deter closed-loop
merchants from using SVPs unless there was a significant
financial upside. Likewise, additional regulatory costs would be
inherent to insure that merchants complied with the insurance
and reporting requirements.
Incorporating a third-party insurance scheme to account for
risk presents different challenges. Most significantly, the cost of
a third-party premium would likely be spread to customers in the
form of higher costs for products. This inflation of the price point
for service would work against the ends of access. Merchants
could pass along the costs of insurance premiums only to
consumers that elect coverage; yet, there again lies the paradox
of consumer gentrification. Those consumers, who are in the best
position to pay for additional security, often will reject it since
the risk of loss is so low. And those consumers who most need
the additional security often times are not in a position to afford
such coverage. While insuring against risk sounds attractive at
the outset, in many ways it feeds into other problems inherent in
the transaction.
B. Creating an Affirmative Security Interest
A second solution to bring balance to the merchant-consumer
relationship would be to create an automatic security interest in
the value of SVP for consumers that register their SVP with the
merchant. Like merchants of consumer products that create
automatic purchase money security interests in items they sell,
consumers could create automatic purchase money security
interests in the funds reserved for future purchase with the
20141
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merchant.195 Such a solution would remove inefficient barriers to
remedies, such as requiring the consumer to file a UCC-1
financing statement. 196
Still, such a solution would require some form of validation.
For example, the purchase money security interest ("PMSI")
requires at the least the execution of a security agreement-or
other form that satisfies UCC 9-203's requirement for
attachment. 197 Consumers could be required to register their
SVPs with the company as a means of creating a security
interest. Alternatively, the mere possession of the SVP
authenticated mechanism could be a sufficient means of
determining who has a security interest and who does not; at
lease two courts have drawn an analogy between SVPs and
bearer instruments. 9 8
One distinctive problem with this solution is that it requires
the consumer to actively do something to create an enforceable
security interest. If the action is registering by electronic
transmission of information, then the question should be asked
whether certain consumers are disadvantaged because they do
not have the technology available that other consumers do.
'95 U.C.C. § 9-309(1).
16 Similar logic is applied to the exemption of merchants to file for consumer
goods and would validate a reverse practice if a security interest was created in
consumers. As stated by numerous authors:
[Tihe reasons for this exception are: (1) consumer transactions are
frequently small, so the expense of filing can significantly add to the price
that the consumer will have to pay; (2) consumer transactions are very
numerous and they would unduly burden the filing system; (3) the pre-
Code rule in most states did not require filing in conditional sale
transactions; and (4) parties to consumer transactions are less likely to
search the records.
Timothy R. Zinnecker, Pimzy Whimsy in the Eleventh Circuit: Reflections on In re
Alphatech System, Inc., 40 GONZ. L. REV. 379, 382 n.19 (2005) (quoting ROBERT L.
JORDAN ET AL., SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 94 (5th ed. 2000));
see also David Gray Carlson, Purchase Money Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
29 IDAHO L. REV. 793, 795 (1992) ("[11f every purchase money security interest in
consumer goods were subject to a filing rule, the files would be clogged with
unedifying financing statements to the point where the system might break down-
and the very lives of the clerks might be at risk-under the crush of a paper
avalanche.").
197 U.C.C. § 9-203.
198 See Mann v. TD Bank, N.A., No. 09-1062 (RBKIAMD), 2010 WL 4226526, at
*9 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2010) ("[F]rom the perspective of contract law, the gift cards in
this case are most closely analogous to bearer financial instruments."). See generally
PrivaCash, Inc. v. Am. Express Co., 747 F. Supp. 2d 1114 (W.D. Wis. 2010).
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While this solution eliminates the cost-barrier to both
merchant and consumer that the insurance model contains, it
also is limited in that it may not provide relief to the consumer
outside of the instance where the merchant finds himself
insolvent. Notably, the cost ratio between actions to enforce a
default and the value of the transaction weigh considerably
against the consumer's use of the courts to bring a claim.
Additionally, while Article 9 affords parties the ability to shape
their agreement and provide for alternative remedies-amongst
which might include attorneys' fees' 99-it is unlikely that a
merchant would include attorneys' fees in its agreement in the
event of a breach. Thus, more than likely the consumer's
security interest only would secure against the possibilities of
insolvency, not breach.
A second concern is the potential for impairing third-party
security interests where the third party was unaware of the
consumer interests. Unlike the automatic PMSI for consumer
goods available in Article 9, the automatic PMSI for SVPs could
not provide a means for creditors to enhance their security
interest. Consumer good PMSI creditors under Article 9 can
protect their security interest against the acts of the debtor by
filing a UCC-1 statement, though it is inefficient and many
creditors will elect not to do so. Since an automatic PMSI on SVP
would not require consumers to file a UCC-1 financing
statement, the potential for impairing other third-party creditors
could exist. Third-party creditors would be dependent on the
merchant-debtor to be forthcoming as to the amount of SVP
products currently perfected by consumers. The policy
underlying an automatic PMSI interest that supersedes another
creditor's interest is that the value of the collateral is generally
small. In this case, the aggregate value would not be small-in
Starbucks case, near $1 billion. Moreover, it is unlikely that we
could enhance competing creditors' claims without defeating the
very purpose of the security interest in the first place. This
problem could find resolution in shifting the loss in such a case to
the debtor-merchant, but in a case where the debtor-merchant is
already insolvent, the resolution is one in name only.
199 U.C.C. § 9-203.
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C. Disabling Other Competing Security Interests
A third solution that takes a passive approach to consumer
fairness would be to disable other security interests from
impairing the consumer's value in the SVP. Article 9 could make
security interests void to the extent that they impair a consumer
SVP. Such a solution would have the benefit of providing a clear
rule for other lenders, who should not extend value on the
assumption that the merchant-debtor's payment intangibles
would secure its lending.
This type of solution has the benefit of familiarity within
Article 9 and consumer law regulation. Article 9 makes certain
transactions unattachable when it relates to consumer
transactions. For example, after-acquired property clauses are
not effective to create security interests in consumer goods unless
the debtor acquires the goods within ten days of giving value. 200
Similarly, the UCC provides that the normal rule for
continuation of security interests after disposition is disabled in
favor of consumers in two circumstances: where the buyer
purchases the goods in the ordinary course of the merchant's
business; and where the buyer purchases a good which was
subject to an automatic PMSI before the filing of a financing
statement and where the goods were purchased for buyer's
personal, family, or household purposes.0 1 Article 3 does not
allow the holder in due course to avoid personal defenses by
consumers where the instrument did not provide direct notice of
the potential transferability.0 2  Each of these instances
represents examples of how the UCC and federal consumer law
disable other creditor security interests in the furtherance of
fairness, amongst other values. Disabling other creditor
interests in the SVP, though certainly protecting the consumer's
interest against the merchant-debtor's insolvency, does not
resolve the problem of the merchant that breaches the terms of
the agreement. The benefit of this solution is that it treats all
consumers as equal.
200 Id. § 9-204(b)(1).
201 Id. § 9-320.
202 This approach is not an unusual approach to consumer protection. As
mentioned in Part II, a holder in due course is subject to personal defenses by a
consumer when the instrument does not inform the consumer that it may be




SVPs present numerous challenges to normal consumer and
commercial frameworks. Normal commercial frameworks
operate within constructions that treat similarly situated parties
in similar ways, with the assumption that parties have similar
means for protecting themselves against risk of loss in the
transaction. SVPs present the unique challenge of consumption
gentrification where our assumptions that like parties are alike
does not always hold.
Consumption gentrification as a metaphor for market
confusion suggests that disparate economic groups may
understand the impacts of their transactions differently. A
salient example is how prepaid cards have found popularity
amongst differing groups of economic participants-low-income
non-banking users and moderate-income individuals. Though
equally beneficial, there remains a stark imbalance between the
risks the issuer takes on compared to that of the holder.
Remedies aside, the low-income user is lured to the merchant's
transaction through the prepaid card; acquiring one is just one
more point-of-sale encounter, in which the merchant is already
intimately familiar, though unaware of the remedies-or lack
thereof-at its disposal.
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